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I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it 
 
Evelyn Beatrice Hall,  
summarising Voltaire 
 
 
 
volo, ergo sum 
 
based on 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
 
 
The promotion of tolerance is the antithesis of the promotion of terrorism 
 
Raphael Perl 
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TOPIC 
At the latest since 9/11 and the associated frights, Islamist motivated terrorism advanced to a 
major international security issue, which not only achieved extensive media coverage, but as 
well broad scientific attention. Nevertheless, the concrete national and international 
measures, with which international terrorism is countered, could well be regarded critically in 
terms of efficiency and accuracy.   
Apart from questionable military engagements, loosened data protection and the curtailing of 
civil rights, there is one element in the discourse about terrorism, which particularly attracted 
the author‟s attention: The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor. Several 
consequences are tied to this construction, which are probably not obvious in the first place. 
One of the most far reaching among these consequences is perhaps the De-Individualisation 
or De-Humanisation of the terrorist. This discursive practice disputes the humanity of the 
terrorist through which an ultimate enemy image is shaped in the so-called war against 
terror. This construction causes the preference of certain counter terrorism measures, 
whereas others are completely expelled from the circle of applicable opportunities of action. 
Most of all; this approach causes a blind spot in the perception of the terrorist, which hardly 
utterly hides psychological, socio economic, ethnic, cultural, religious and regional contexts 
in deep darkness that makes a comprehension of the complex lifeworld of a terrorist 
impossible.  
One could argue that it is not at all important to understand perpetrators of terrorism, to 
acquire knowledge about their requirements; their social embeddedness or their motivations, 
as they could simplified be regarded as evil, irrational or mentally disordered psychopaths 
who pose a danger to the entire Western civilisation. However, as the conflict between the 
Western nations and the global Jihadist movement is not a classical conflict about territory or 
resources, but a symbolic conflict about values, ideologies and diametrically opposing Modi 
Vivendi1, which can´t be won through conventional warfare, I will hold against this reasoning 
that it is not only important, but crucial to understand the antagonist in order to implement 
accurate and efficient measures to face the threat of international terrorism.  
In applying postmodern concepts, I will therefore try to deconstruct the image of the terrorist, 
which is currently especially in public discussion tainted with stereotypes and reconstruct it in 
a way which shall show, that there are indeed alternatives to the predominate associations, 
which could probably lead to more target-aimed opportunities of action. 
                                               
1
 (Zalman, 2006) 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
The previous remarks lead to the following research question, which shall act as the 
recurrent theme around which this paper is going to circulate.  
Which postmodern alternative(s) could be opposed to the construction of the 
terrorist as an illegitimate actor? 
The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor, or even as a non-individual has 
distinct effects on the possibilities of conflict resolution and prevention, on the strategies and 
measures of counter terrorism actions, on the expectations of the involved actors and on 
their methods of communication and interaction. Beyond that, this construction especially 
affect the discourse about the conflict between the Western-industrialised, “civilised” world 
and the people on the other side of this not nearly only virtual demarcation line.  
Through a postmodern approach, I will try to describe terrorism, without trivialising or morally 
justifying it, as a phenomenon inherent in the system of the Wests‟ hegemonic globalising 
attempts and by that reveal alternatives to the current construction of the terrorist, which 
hopefully are not any longer blind towards his psychological, socio economic, ethnic, cultural, 
religious and regional contexts and lifeworlds. 
These considerations lead us to the following working hypotheses, whereby the outlined 
topic shall be processed and which will serve as an argumentative structure for the paper at 
hand.    
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WORKING HYPOTHESES 
 
(H1) The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor leads to a De-
Individualisation or De-Humanisation of the individual. 
(H2) This De-Humanisation blocks the view on psychological, socio economic, 
ethnic, cultural, religious and regional contexts.    
(H3) The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor prevents us from 
elaborating alternative perceptions and strategies. 
(H4) The implementation of postmodern approaches enables a deconstruction of 
this concept.  
 
OPERATIONALISATIONS 
The following enumeration of indicators, which shall help to operationalise the previous 
hypotheses, raises at this point no claim to completeness. Rather should the analysis of the 
gathered data unveil further indicators for the formulised hypotheses to complement this list 
or alternatively disqualify some of the subsequent factors, if they do not seem appropriate.   
 
(H1) The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor leads to a De-
Individualisation or De-Humanisation of the individual. 
 
The concept of De-Individualisation or De-Humanisation shall be operationalised through the 
following indicators: 
 
 disputing a terrorists rationality, as this is a fundamental feature of the 
human being 
 different media coverage and valuation of dead people and victims (e.g.: 
the hostage-taking ended with no human victims; 8 terrorists were killed) 
 curtailing of the civil rights in practice (e.g.: detainment without a concrete 
charge, torture, deportations, etc.) 
 hiding of terrorists faces with masks or bags or blanking out social contexts 
to maintain the perceived distance 
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(H2) This De-Humanisation blocks the view on psychological, socio economic, 
ethnic, cultural, religious and regional contexts.    
 
The following concepts shall serve as indicators for the second hypothesis, whereby the 
negative formulation of the hypothesis shall describe the absence of the consideration of 
these factors. The line of argumentation aims to show that blinding out these indicators has a 
negative impact on the comprehension of the genesis of terrorist potential:  
 
 psychological conditions, as group dynamics, individual history, etc.  
 social framework conditions as family structure, institutions, gender 
relations, etc. 
 economic conditions as the predominant structure of income, differences in 
the allocation of wealth and goods, etc. 
 ethnic backgrounds 
 historically grown and socialised action patterns, especially regarding the 
legitimacy of the use of violence 
 cultural conditions, values and norms  
 regional peculiarities 
 educational level 
 religious influence on society  
 
(H3) The construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor prevents us from 
elaborating alternative perceptions and strategies. 
 
The third hypothesis sets itself the goal to question the apparently generally valid main 
imagination towards a terrorist by confronting them with alternative concepts and 
interpretations. The current discourse about the terrorist seems to be mainly dominated by 
the following indicators: 
 
 enemy image 
 threat 
 foreign 
 uncivilised 
 religious fundamentalist 
 uneducated 
 fanatic 
 mentally disturbed 
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(H4) The implementation of postmodern approaches enables a deconstruction of 
this concept.  
 
The fourth hypothesis describes the authors‟ goal to deconstruct the perception of the 
terrorist through postmodern approaches and as a result showing alternative opportunities of 
association. Particular attention shall be thrown on possible sources of postmodern 
tendencies in current literature, on which could be build on in the progressing line of 
reasoning. Significant indicators for postmodernism could be: 
 
 pluralism of value systems  
 equal value of diametrical opposing modi vivendi 
 multi dimensionality of social processes 
 difference as a positive feature of society just as 
 heterogeneity 
 the end of meta-narratives and the great stories 
 pluralisation of the modern key concepts, which are  
o truth 
o rationality 
o aesthetic 
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VARIABLES 
In this section, I will briefly illustrate the variables, which will form the core of the research at 
hand in order to be clear about what the main interest of this paper is and how this interest 
shall be processed.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable of this thesis is the individual terrorist. Put simply, a person shall be 
labelled as a terrorist, if he is a perpetrator of terrorist acts, uses the tactic of terrorism or 
supports such acts with significant contributions. Thus, a terrorist is an actor, who actually 
uses or at least threatens to use the means of violence against public institutions or against 
civilians to pursue religious, political or cultural goals and who lacks of an appropriate state 
legitimacy for his deeds.2  
Because of the multiple forms and backgrounds of and various motivations for terrorism, it is 
hardly impossible to formulate general statements, which hold true for all perpetrators of 
terrorism. Therefore, it is important to specify the actors, which shall be included in this 
research and distinguish them from other groups to avoid an excessive conceptual stretching 
and maintain the validity of the following reasoning. Hence, the focus shall rest on the 
terrorist with an extremist Islamist background, who is commonly labelled as Jihadist. If the 
results of the argumentation in this paper could as well find application in the analysis of 
other terrorist actors has to be examined separately. 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Serving the clarity, the independent variables, which come across as the vital factors in 
describing and defining the terrorist, will explicitly be mentioned below. As their respective 
indicators are already listed above, they shall not be repeated at this point, but be discussed 
in the referring chapters.   
 
 the conception as an illegitimate actor 
 the conception as a non-individual 
 psychological, socio economic, ethnic, cultural, religious and regional 
contexts 
 censorship of alternative approaches 
                                               
2
 cf (Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 2006) 
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APPROACH & PROCEDURE 
The research design of this paper is explicitly laid out exploratory and qualitative and 
renounces the broad use of statistics or the inquiry of quantifiable data. Thereby, the design 
orientates itself at the prior interpretative research question, which tries to protrude into the 
interpretation and meaning adscription process towards the terrorist. The formulated 
hypotheses, operationalisations and indicators serve as an orientation at the start of this 
research and literature review and shall be understood as the authors‟ personal disposition 
and conceptual starting point. For the purpose of a grounded theory3 approach shall the 
review of the state-of-the-art scientific contributions deliver information about the structures, 
meaning- and association patterns, which characterise the discourse about the terrorist.  
The first step in the research process will be a critical examination of the scientific 
contributions about the key theoretical concepts of the research question, which are terrorism 
in general, Jihadism and postmodernism. The aim of this first part is not to completely 
discuss all the different aspects and approaches of these complex phenomenons, but to give 
an overview of the key considerations and specify the meaning of these terms regarding to 
the following arguments of the paper at hand.  
As the aim of the author is to deliver a perception of the terrorist, which takes account of the 
global social processes, especially referring to globalisation and postmodernism, it is 
necessary to understand the phenomenon of terrorism as well. Thus, several levels of 
observation have to be considered when examining terrorism, including the tactical and 
strategic level of terrorism as well as its embeddedness in global structure processes. 
Turning back to the perpetrator of terror, again different layers of examination have to be 
considered, which range from the individual/psychological level, over the group level to the 
social level, finally ending up again at the highest layer of global structures.  
After this introduction into the theoretical background of these topics, the second step will 
proceed to deliver evidences for or against the formulated hypothesis in recent scientific 
publications to draw a tentative picture of the current image(s) of the Islamist terrorist.  
The third step is dedicated to the deconstruction of the previously delineated picture through 
the implementation of postmodern concepts into the predominant perception of the terrorist. 
Through this, the author hopes to design a genuine concept of the terrorist, which could be 
used for further scientific considerations and probably contributes to more efficient and 
prosperous counter terrorism strategies, which include the contemporary, often ambiguous 
societal processes in the world.  
    
                                               
3
 (Strauss, 1998) 
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THEORY, CONCEPTS & DEFINITIONS 
 
TERRORISM 
The following pages shall give an insight in the recent terrorism research and thereby deliver 
a profound fundament for further argumentation. This chapter will first deal with terrorism in 
general, how terrorism is defined by different international actors and institutions, and then 
proceeds with Islamist motivated terror, perpetrators of terrorism, their motivations and a 
discussion about root causes of terror.  
 
WHAT IS TERRORISM? 
First of all, it is worth mentioning that there is neither a consistent definition of terrorism 
among the numerous disciplines of social sciences, which deal with this phenomenon nor 
among political institutions, which are responsible for counter terrorism measures.4 
Therefore, this section will start with some examples of current definitions of terrorism, in 
order to get a slight overview over the existing concepts.  
Second, whenever we talk about terrorism, we have to be aware that there is no such thing 
as “the terrorism” and that not all terrorism is the same. Noricks proposes at least ten 
different forms of terrorism, distinguished by its motivation and ideology, which shall be listed 
at this point to illustrate the heterogeneous character of this phenomenon.  
 
 criminal 
 ethno-nationalist 
 religious 
 generic secular 
 right-wing (religious) 
 secular left wing 
 secular right wing 
 single issue 
 personal/idiosyncratic 
 state-sponsored5 
 
This list shall remind us during the further argumentation that the use of abstract words like 
terrorism always has to be framed with the context and that they refer to a complex pattern of 
meanings, structures and actors. After the introduction of common key features of terrorism, 
where the term is indeed used in its most general meaning, it will later explicitly refer to the 
phenomenon of Islamist motivated international terrorism.  
                                               
4
 (OSCE, 2007, p. 22) 
5
 (Noricks, 2009, p. 53) 
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DEFINITIONS 
Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism in distinction to criminality or other activities of irregular 
armed fighters with the following features: 
 “terrorism is 
 ineluctably political in aims and motives 
 violent - or, equally important, threatens violence 
 designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim or target 
 conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of 
command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear 
no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small 
collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or 
inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent 
terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and 
 perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity” 6 
 
A United Nations definition of terrorism reads as follows:  
“[Terrorism is] …any action … that is intended to cause death or serious bodily 
harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its 
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or 
an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” 7 
Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency defines terrorism according to the Title 22 of the 
US Code, Section 2656f(d): 
“The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents. 
The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving the territory or the 
citizens of more than one country. 
The term “terrorist group” means any group that practices, or has significant 
subgroups that practice, international terrorism.” 8 
                                               
6
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 40) 
7
 (United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes, 2004, p. 45) 
8
 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007) 
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An OSCE attempt to describe terrorism can be found in the Manual on Countering Terrorism, 
Protecting Human Rights: 
“Terrorism occurs in many different contexts and takes different forms. Without 
seeking to define terrorism here, we can consider some of its consistent 
features including: 
 its organized nature (whether the organization involved is large 
or small); 
 its dangerousness (to life, limb and property); 
 its attempt to undermine government in particular (by seeking to 
influence policy and law-makers); 
 its randomness and consequential spreading of fear/terror 
among a population.” 9 
 
The most fundamental definition of terrorism, used by the RAND Corporation in the cited 
publication, describes terrorism as:  
“… the use or threatened use of violence for the purpose of inducing terror.” 10 
One point, on which probably every institution or researcher could agree on, is that terrorism 
is a deeply pejorative term.11 It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations, which is 
generally applied to ones enemies or opponents. Thus, the label terrorism is a quite 
subjective term; whom someone calls a terrorist or not strongly depends on his personal 
point of view, his social context, his lifeworld and socialisation and therefore, whether he 
sympathises with or opposes the actors or the cause that is concerned.12 How important this 
subjective logic is going to be for the further argumentation will evolve in the upcoming 
chapter about postmodernism.  
At this point, we shall lay our attention to the examples of definitions for terrorism. As we see, 
the first key feature of terrorism, so to say an essential condition for the connotation of an 
action as terrorism is the use or the threatened use of violence against civilians or 
noncombatants. 
“The terrorist is fundamentally a violent intellectual, prepared to use, and 
indeed, committed to using force in the attachment of his goals.” 13 
                                               
9
 (OSCE, 2007, p. 23) 
10
 (Davis & Cragin, 2009, p. 4) 
11
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 23) 
12
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 23) 
13
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 38) 
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At this point, one could ask why we don´t label terrorists as war criminals? If regular armed 
forces of a state intimidate, threaten or use violence against civilians or noncombatants, this 
would be the term to use. Here we find the first important distinction between perpetrators of 
terrorism and regular armed forces, who commit war crimes. While the former have no 
recognised state-entity, which hold responsibility for their actions, the later are under the 
direct influence of an internationally recognised political body.  
The second important distinction is settled in the simple fact that according to the general 
international law, terrorist and to a certain extent counter terrorist actions, are not understood 
as activities of classical warfare.14 Therefore, terrorists can´t be labelled as war criminals, 
basically because they are not situated in a state of war. Furthermore, there is a fundamental 
difference between the violence of a regular armed force and the violence of terror attacks: 
“Even in war there are rules and accepted norms of behaviour that prohibit the 
use of certain types of weapons and proscribe various tactics and outlaw 
attacks on specific categories of targets.” 15   
Accordingly in theory, regrettably not always in praxis, the Geneva and The Hague 
Conventions on Warfare16 grant civilian noncombatants not only immunity from attack, but as 
well prohibit hostage taking, outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POW´s, recognise 
neutral territories and the rights of their citizens and uphold the inviolability of diplomats and 
other accredited representatives. While regular armed forces in general respect this rules of 
warfare, terrorists‟ modus operandi is not rarely the intended violating of these rules.17  
“… one of the fundamental raisons d´être of international terrorism is a refusal 
to be bound by such rules of warfare and codes of conduct.” 18  
For further information about the legal status of terroristic acts in the international law, the 
author strongly recommends the master thesis of Raffelseder (2008).19   
The third key feature, and what distinguishes terrorists from ordinary criminals, is that their 
aims are fundamentally political. While criminals usually perpetrate certain actions for 
personal benefits but do not question the regime itself, terrorists try to erode, if not destroy 
the political system as such with their campaigns.20 
Another important distinction, which demarcates terrorists from other irregulars like guerrillas 
or insurgencies, is their formal appearance and their logistical capabilities, while later operate 
                                               
14
 (Raffelseder, 2008, p. 44f) 
15
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 26) 
16
 (Die Genfer Abkommen von 1949 und die Zusatzprotokolle I-III, 2010) 
17
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 27) 
18
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 28) 
19
 (Raffelseder, 2008) 
20
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 37) 
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as a military unit, directly attack enemy military forces and seize and hold territory, the 
former:  
“… do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to 
seize or hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in 
combat, are constraint both numerically and logistically from undertaking 
concerted mass political mobilization efforts, and exercise no direct control or 
governance a populace at either the local or the national level.” 21  
We will discuss the different possible motivations for terrorism in a far greater extent later on. 
Let us just keep in mind that terrorist are currently not understood as actors of war, and that 
they use violence to intimidate a population to obtain political goals.  
 
THE HISTORY OF TERROR 
The word terror itself was first popularised during the French revolution and had a quite 
positive connotation. The “regime de la terreur” 22 was established 1793 after the French 
Revolution to maintain order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval. 
Contrary to today‟s understanding of terror as actions against governments or institutions by 
non-state entities, the regime de la terreur was an instrument of governance implemented by 
the newly built revolutionary state and strongly tied to the values of the French Revolution, 
virtue and democracy. Indeed, even Robespierre firmly believed that virtue was the incentive 
of a popular government at peace, but that, during a time, which is characterised by 
revolution and turmoil; it needs terror to help democracy to triumph.  
“He appealed famously to `virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without 
which virtue is helpless´ and proclaimed: `Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, 
severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.´”23 
Although there are serious divergence from its subsequent meaning, the French Revolutions 
“terrorism” still shares at least two key features with today‟s terrorist organisations: both are 
neither random nor indiscriminate, as modern terrorism is often described, but organised, 
deliberate and systematic; and moreover, both share the same goals and justification: the 
creation of a new and better society in place of a fundamental corrupt and, out of their 
perspective, undemocratic political system.24 
Not only on the ideological level, but as well on the operational level have the recent assaults 
of nowadays terrorist movements a lot in common with earlier formations. The Irish groups of 
the 19th century for example, had a deep impact on the evolution and development of 
                                               
21
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 35) 
22
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 3) 
23
 Robespierre quoted in (Hoffman, 2006, p. 3) 
24
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4) 
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terrorism techniques. They were the first to recognise the importance of establishing a 
foreign base beyond the reach of their enemy. Such a sanctuary is crucial not only for 
logistical and strategic planning matters, but as well for promoting a protracted terrorist 
campaign, distributing propaganda and for the solicitation of operational funds.25 These 
groups as well introduced time-delayed explosive devices and the targeting of mass 
transport, accompanied with a distinct disregard of innocent human life.26  
Shall it be the Russian Anti-Czarists of the late 19th and early 20th century, the Red Army 
Fractions in Germany, Italy‟s Red Brigades, postcolonial or separatist violence in Palestine, 
Africa or the Far East or nowadays-international terrorism, what all of them have in common 
is the ultimate goal to change the hegemonic political system into an idealised regime 
according to their respective ideologies.27  
The paper at hand is not able to roll up the entire history of terrorism at this point, but it is 
important to understand that terrorism is not a particular phenomenon of the second half of 
the 20th or the first decade of the 21st century and that the Western world as we know it in the 
present day is at least partly formed through processes and campaigns, which today could 
be easily labelled as terrorism.  
This shows us that the label terrorism lies in the eye of the beholder and history could 
transform terrorists to freedom fighters or even political leaders. This subjective view on 
terrorism is brought straight to the point by Yasir Arafat, who declared in front of the UN 
General Assembly that: 
“The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason 
for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the 
freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the 
colonialists, cannot possibly be called terrorist.”28 
This view is opposed by realist researchers like Jenkins, who counters this relativistic 
approach through a more pragmatic perception of terrorism:   
“terrorism… should be defined `by the nature of the act, not by the identity of 
the perpetrators or the nature of their cause.´”29 
What the author tries to illustrate is that one of nowadays most dangerous threats for global 
security, international Islamist terrorism, is not a particularity of the 21st century. It is just an 
anew uprising of a well-known phenomenon, which uses the capabilities of the modern 
society, like the Internet, international itineraries, cell phones or email to distribute their 
                                               
25
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 10) 
26
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 11) 
27
 (Hoffman, 2006, p. 4) 
28
 (Arafat, 1974) 
29
 (Jenkins, 1980, p. 2) 
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claims in the entire world. Through this globalisation of terror, of which we will hear more in a 
later chapter, terrorism gets de-regionalised and therefore affects the whole world population 
instead of strictly definable spots on the world map.   
Therefore, the meaning of terrorism in general shifted from an individual phenomenon of 
subnational violence to one of several elements or part of a wider pattern of non-state 
conflicts30, where non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organisations pose 
a threat to the stability of nation states and where the control of large regions or urban areas 
shifted through violence from governments to new half political, half criminal powers.  
Terrorism and perpetrators of terrorism, especially in the context of Islamist motivated 
terrorism, today is not an exactly definable entity, with clear hierarchical structures, definite 
regional expansion or a homogenous group of participating individuals. The re-emergence of 
religious terrorism in the 1980´s set in motion profound changes in the nature, the 
motivations and in the capabilities of terrorists that are still unfolding and thereby transformed 
the phenomenon of terrorism into an arguably more diffuse and amorphous phenomenon.31  
In contrast to stereotypical terrorist organisations of the 1970´s or „80´s, which were 
organised in hierarchical, pyramidal structures in cohesive organisational entities, nowadays 
terrorist networks and their members are part of a far more indistinct and broad movement. 
They tend to operate in a linear rather than a hierarchical basis. The classical cell structure 
vanished today in favour of more loosely connected or indirectly linked networks, consisting 
of both “professionals” and “amateurs”, who may lack the expertise or experience of their 
better-established counterparts.32 This phenomenon, often labelled as leaderless resistance, 
phantom cell network, autonomous cells, networks of networks, or even lone wolves, has 
become one of the most important trends in terrorism today.33  
Al Qaeda is the manifestation of this phenomenon, as it underwent an organisational 
evolution from a bureaucratic entity that could be destroyed and an irregular army that could 
be defeated into a clearly less powerful, but nevertheless more resilient amorphous entity it is 
today, which is active around the world.34 Along with this transformation comes the 
geographical diffusion of terror attacks. Whereas earlier suicide campaigns were 
geographically concentrated in the regions, where a readily identifiable political, ethnic, 
and/or religious conflict were raging, today‟s suicide campaigns with Islamist background 
appear to be more and more unattached to national borders or certain regions and spread 
fear across the entire globe.35  
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This phenomenon of fragmentation and pluralisation is an important hint for the 
transformation of terrorism in the postmodern era. Hence, we will have to further discuss this 
later in this paper. But before terrorism will be embedded in the context of broader societal 
developments, the layer of observation shall focus on the tactical level for the moment.  
 
TERRORISM AS A TACTIC   
What is terrorism actually? Well an accurate answer has to refer to the level of observation. 
On the operational level, terrorism is nothing more than a tactic; Noteworthy, a tactic that 
works36. 
“Although governments throughout history and all over the world always claim 
that terrorism is ineffective as an instrument of political change, the examples 
of Israel, Cyprus, and Algeria, and of Begin, Makarios, and Ahmed Ben Bella 
provide convincing evidence to the contrary.” 37 
Not to forget the grandfather of today‟s terrorism, Robespierre.  
Its utility lies in the capability of provocation, polarisation, mobilisation and compellence.38 
Terrorism is in addition highly effective and comparatively cheap.39  
It could harm millions of people physically and, probably even more important, 
psychologically through the actions of very few perpetrators. Terrorism as a tactic lifts 
groups, we otherwise never would have heard of, onto the cover pages of newspapers and 
into the prime time news. It enables these groups to broadcast their claims through the 
medium of violence into the entire world and as a result probably even activate imitators or 
sympathisers.40  
Terrorism as a tactic is used by groups or individuals, who experience the deep compulsion 
to raise their voice against the Western hegemonic system, which is distributed through 
globalisation into the remotest corners of the world. However, as these groups obviously 
believe, that their voices won´t be heart, they instead speak through the sounds of their guns 
and the detonation blasts of their bombs.41  
As mentioned before, on a very general level, perpetrators of terrorism seek to change the 
political system under which they, on a subjective level, suffer. In order to obtain this goal, 
they basically need two things: publicity, mainly through media coverage, and power.  
Publicity, because in the modern society, the world is highly perceived though the lenses of 
the media. Whether it is online in social media like facebook, YouTube or in blogs, or offline 
in newspapers or television, we use the media to develop our view about worldwide events to 
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the highest possible extent. In order to obtain certain goals, or even to exist for a broad 
public, you have to be present in the media. Therefore, and as the predominating rule in the 
news business is only bad news are good news, perpetrators of terrorism use the instrument 
of violence to carry this rule to the extreme.  
“The primary target is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but 
those made to witness it.” 42 
Thereby, the victims‟ own information media amplify the attacks and therefore become the 
perpetrators accomplices in afflicting the larger target population. The special implications of 
the outstanding role of the media will be discussed more detailed in the chapter 
“Postmodernism”. Let us at this point only record that the primary aim of terror attacks is to 
target the audience, not the destroyed object itself.  
What gives terrorists power is the fact that their unpredictable attacks leaves a big part of the 
society in a state of fear. After 9/11 and the attacks against major European cities, terrorism 
was delivered straight into the heart of the Western society and into the heads of their 
citizens. Moreover, it is an ever-present, visible threat. It is manifested in the security controls 
at airports, public transport stations, malls or mass events. The fear of terror attacks compels 
our governments and municipalities to deploy video cameras on highly frequented places, 
abhorrent phone calls or intercept emails. The significant consequences for the Western civil 
liberties tied to these measures will be explored in detail later on.  
This described fear forces us to recognise the existence of perpetrators of terrorism and 
avoids us from turning our heads away from them.   
However, It is definitely too short handed just to identify terrorism as the tactic of choice for 
the weak, poor, suppressed or politically underrepresented communities, or as the irrational 
actions of a handful of fanatics or fundamentalists.43  
Terrorism, an especially suicide terrorism, of which we will hear more later in this section, is 
rather an efficient way for non-state actors to fight against perceived enemy states, whose 
armies easily outnumber them and would doubtless defeat them in a direct military 
encounter.  
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“Terrorists further argue that, because of their numerical inferiority, far more 
limited firepower, and paucity of resources compared with an established 
nation-state´s massive defence and national security apparatus, they have no 
choice but to operate clandestinely, emerging from the shadows to carry out 
dramatic acts of hit-and-run violence in order to attract attention to, and ensure 
publicity for, themselves and their cause.” 44 
This tactic includes among others classical hit and run techniques, hidden bomb assaults 
against civilians, suicide missions, hostage taking, hijacking, briefly spoken, every technique, 
which enables terrorists to deploy a maximum of damage at comparable low costs.  
“Small groups of terrorists could kill millions and could make the economic 
system fall apart.” 45 
The success of this tactic often lies in the perceived influence, in the impact on the reality of 
everyday life. This impact is measured through the amount of publicity and attention 
received. The satisfaction of simply being noticed even makes a distinction between positive 
and negative connoted publicity more or less obsolete.46  
As the wide public as well as the media get more and more progressively inured or 
desensitised to the seemingly endless litany of bloodshed, devastating bombings and suicide 
attacks, this obsession with public attention and media coverage could easily lead to an 
upward spiral of violence, as ever more shocking and tremendous attacks have to be 
committed in order to keep the eye of the media, and with that the focus of public attention, 
on the terrorists and on their demands.47  
Violence itself is used as a tool to gain the necessary (political) power to obtain the terrorists´ 
goals. As all terrorism is a quest for power, power to dominate, coerce, to intimidate, to 
control and ultimately to effect fundamental political change, violence is thus the sine qua 
non of terrorists.48  
They are deeply convinced that their cause can only triumph and their long-term political 
aims can only be attained through the more or less extensive use of violence. Especially 
cruel and threatening forms of violence are suicide attacks, which we will discuss in the 
following paragraphs.  
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SUICIDE TERRORISM 
Suicide terrorism in general means the 
“… targeted use of self-destructing humans against noncombatant - typically 
civilian - population to effect political change.” 49 
Despite the fact, that a suicide attack, just as terrorist attacks in general, aims to physically 
destroy an initial target, its primary use is, as we already heard before, typically as a weapon 
of psychological warfare intended to affect a larger public audience.50   
Martyrdom operations represent an odd and abnormal type of violent behaviour, which 
signals the perpetrators‟ rejection of compromise and their recourse to unconventional 
warfare.51 
Because of its unique tactical advantages, terrorists became increasingly attracted to suicide 
terrorism.  
“Suicide tactics are devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have a greater 
likelihood of success, and are relatively inexpensive and generally easier to 
execute than other attack modes.” 52 
The decision to implement this tactic is therefore neither irrational nor desperate53, as it is 
often described; it is rather a deeply rational and calculated decision and thus understood as 
a purposeful instrument of warfare.  
Suicide terrorism, while looking irrational at first sight, may still be considered as the outcome 
of individual, or collective rational choice.54 Especially if such acts of self-destruction have a 
cultural and religious context.55 For radical Islamist groups, the instrument of suicide 
terrorism gets through religious and theological justifications an outstanding role among their 
toolbox. Not only justifies their interpretation of the Qur‟an suicide attacks as a duty to fight 
against the perceived enemies of the Islam, but also ensures the legitimation of such attacks 
through several religious leaders a flow of recruits to these organisations, which they need in 
order to sustain suicide operations56. We will learn more about the theological justification of 
suicide attacks at noncombatants in the chapter “Jihad and the Jihadist”.  
Generally spoken, a suicide operation differs from any other attack through the feature that 
the death of the perpetrator is essential for the success of the assault. The suicide terrorist 
becomes the ultimate smart bomb; a human missile relentlessly homing its target, but with 
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the flexibility of timing and approach to the goal.57 Not only is the suicide terrorist able to 
conduct last minute changes, depending on visible security measures, ease or difficulty of 
approach and the number of civilians at the target. In addition, suicide operations are 
remarkable cheap to mount. By virtue of appraisals, a typical Palestinian suicide mission 
costs about 150 USD, while suicide operations in Israel inflicting six times the number of 
deaths and 26 times more casualties than other acts of terrorism.58  
As we heard before, an important reason for radical groups to use terrorism lies in the desire 
to obtain public attention for their respective concerns. Given its irresistible combination of 
savagery and bloodshed, suicide attacks are hardly guaranteed to provide broad media 
coverage.59 In addition, suicide terrorism is, after the use of WMD´s,60 probably the most 
powerful psychological weapon. No other terrorist tactic arguably induces the same fear and 
paralysis in the terrorists´ target audience. As we heard before while discussing different 
definitions of terrorism, this is exactly the purpose of terrorist groups: to intimidate 
governments and entire populations alike and create a climate of profound fear and 
insecurity, which they can manipulate and exploit to their advantage.61 Thus, the subjective 
aspect of the threat is just as important as the objective aspect.62  
On the other side, the use of suicide terrorism marks a remarkable shift in the discourse 
about acceptable instruments and strategies in the fight against Western influence.  
While suicide, the senseless act of taking one‟s life, especially in Islamic shaped societies, is 
usually regarded as aberrant, abnormal and considered as a capital sin, the suicide terrorist 
act becomes more and more accepted, commonplace and receives a demonstrably positive 
connotation through using the concept of self-sacrifice or istishhad.63 Terrorist organisations 
achieve this mind-shift through a remarkable marketing campaign, consisting of images of 
suicide terrorists emblazoned on murals, wall posters, calendars and even key chains.64  
In addition, the families of a suicide terrorist are suddenly elevated in their social status and 
receive financial and material goods or nice living accommodations like furniture or even 
jewellery as death benefits.65 This recalibration of social values by terrorist organisation leads 
to the opinion in the respective in-group, that suicide bombers are not at all people with 
psychological problems, but that they are celebrated for their bravery and selflessness.66    
Thus, suicide terrorism is basically an instrumental strategy. This exceptional threat to 
national and international security has intrinsically less to do with the perceived injustices, the 
desperation or frustration of its perpetrators, than with the strategic requirements of the 
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organisations, which send these bombers on their mission. The strategic advantages of 
suicide missions are outstanding, as they are shocking, deadly, cost-effective, secure and 
very difficult to stop.67  
Furthermore 
“Suicide terror attacks are rational acts undertaken as part of a deliberately 
calculated and orchestrated campaign to undermine confidence in government 
and leadership, crush popular morale, and spread fear and intimidation.” 68 
Apart from the striking tactical advantages of suicide terrorism, there is, at least for the 
purpose of this thesis, an even more crucial aspect of suicide terrorism, namely the salient 
symbolic implications of putting the own death into stake, of which more later.  
 
RELIGIOUS TERRORISM 
The IRA69, the PLO70 and the FLN71, just to name a few terrorist organisations, all have one 
feature in common: Although they have strong connections to a certain religion and even 
religion is often used as a legitimating reason for their actions, their nature is indubitably 
political. The pre-eminence of their ethno-nationalist and irredentist aims is incontestable.72 
These groups are or were fighting for independence, territories, civil rights or equal secular 
goals.  
For others, like Al Qaeda or Aum Shinrikyo, “the religious motive is overriding.”73 
Actually, for lots of scientists, the religious imperative for terrorism is the most important 
defining characteristic of terrorist activity today.74 This not only holds true for an Islamist 
background of terrorism, instead, hardly all the world‟s major religions produce fundamental 
subgroups, and lots of them tend to use violence in order to obtain their respective goals. 
Nevertheless, it is at this point important to mention, that 
“… although religion is not completely innocent (in many cases, religion 
provided the ideology, the motivation, and the organisational structure), it 
generally does not - by itself - lead to violence. Only when religion is combined 
with movements for social or political change, in which norms about the use of 
violence have been reinterpreted, does it lead to violence.” 75 
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The inversion of the former predominant secularisation of terrorism, which started 
approximately after WWII, leads to new challenges and dangerous situations. 
Religious terrorism differentiates from its secular counterparts in its: 
“… radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimation and 
justification, concepts of morality, and worldviews…” 76 
For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty 
executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative.77 Thus, religious 
terror contains a transcendental dimension, which serves as an ultimate justification for their 
actions, despite their political, moral or practical consequences.  
Whereas secular terrorist groups usually dismiss the option of using large scale violence 
against noncombatants or civilians, as such actions are seen as counterproductive for their 
cause, if not immoral, religious terrorists, on the contrary, seek exactly this elimination of a 
broadly defined population and see that not only as morally justified, but as necessary 
expedients for the attainment of their goals.78  
The religious justification of terrorist activities leads to a strong connection between terrorist 
groups and radical clerical authorities of the respective religion, who interpret the religious 
texts in a way, which legitimates violent actions. The distinctness of connection becomes 
more obvious, if we keep in mind that religious terror attacks not seldom require blessings 
from a clerical authority, which means nothing else but a divine approval of the assaults.    
Finally, even the self-image of religious terrorists and the perception of their violent acts are 
highly different compared to those of secular terrorists. While the later regard violence as a 
means of instigating the correction of an existing system or the creation of a new order, the 
former:  
“… see themselves not as components of a system worth preserving but as 
outsiders seeking fundamental changes in the existing order.” 79 
This sense of alienation from this world enables them to implement far more destructive 
terrorist campaigns and to identify a far more open-ended category of enemies as targets for 
their assaults. In the utmost consequence, anyone, who is not a member of the terrorist 
organisation, sect or other form of community becomes a potential target.  
Despite the cited arguments, it is questionable whether the “new” religious terrorism really 
differs significantly from the “old” secular terror campaigns along the three relevant 
dimensions, its goals, its methods and its forms of organisation.80  
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Detailed discussion will follow in the upcoming chapters, but there are strong evidences that 
the new terrorism is not as new as often suggested. In fact, using terrorism to expel a foreign 
occupier is a tried-and-true method throughout history, just as the aim to seize power or to 
implement a revolutionary change. Moreover, the methods of religious terrorism are well 
known and remained largely low tech. Even the cloudy organisation form of today´s 
international terrorism, especially of Al Qaeda, have been observed before and rather seem 
to be a response to the steady erosion of the organisation through the loss of key operatives 
in the ongoing war on terror.81   
“Thus, terrorism associated with Islamic extremist tendencies varies from the 
past along these three dimensions, but the difference is one of degree rather 
than kind. The fundamental process of terrorism has not changed.” 82 
Even the role of religion, as we will hear later on, is more than questionable, if not on the 
instrumental, than at least on the organisation‟s motivation level.  
Remarkably, the associated rhetoric of holy terror often labels anyone outside the respective 
in-group with denigrating and dehumanising terms, as for example infidels, dogs, children of 
Satan or mud people. This effect of dehumanising the opponent was mentioned in the 
introduction of this paper, but used it on the very other side of the mirror, namely in 
describing the way in which the terrorist is perceived in the Western media and public 
discussion.  
Obviously, the process of depreciation of one‟s enemy is a very human strategy, both on the 
individual level, as well as at the group- and macro level, to demarcate an in-group from its 
respective out-group.  
The deliberate use of such terminology is significant on both sides of this conflict. This is 
especially an alarming observation, as this perception of the opponent further erodes 
constraints on violence and bloodshed by portraying the victims of this conflict as either 
subhuman or unworthy of living.83  
“Individuals tend to misperceive differences between group norms as more 
extreme than they really are. Resulting misunderstandings - encouraged by 
religious and ideological propaganda - lead antagonistic groups to interpret 
each other‟s views of events, such as terrorism/freedom fighting, as wrong, 
radical, and/or irrational. Mutual demonization and warfare readily ensue.” 84 
A vicious circle, which could lead to an unpredictable death toll, suffering and dreads.  
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JIHAD AND THE JIHADIST 
After a rather general discussion of religious terrorism, we shall lay the focus on the radical 
Islamist terrorism, which is usually labelled as Jihadism and thereby give a special attention 
to the disputed theological justification of Jihad and its different forms. According to a rather 
moderate interpretation of the Qur‟an, 
“Jihad in Islam is a defensive movement against those who impose violence.” 85 
While the core characteristics of religious terrorism, described in the previous chapter, are 
more or less common to religious terrorists of all faiths, they have nevertheless most 
regularly been associated with Islamist terrorist groups in general and Al Qaeda in particular. 
However, it is important to emphasise, and the author apologises for any repetition at this 
point, that terrorism is not to be used equivalent with the word Islam, Arab or other ethnical, 
religious or national features of a single person or community. As we heard before, all the 
major religious communities and political entities in this world contain extremist elements to a 
certain extent.  
Nevertheless, as the focus of this thesis shall lay on the Islamist motivated terrorist, in the 
following chapter, the main aspects of the Islamist motivated terrorist campaign against the 
Western society, commonly labelled as Jihad, will be briefly illustrated, and some of the main 
arguments and the intrinsic logic of this globally active movement will be delivered.  
Because of the inherently subjective process of religious interpretation, whereby immutable 
religious texts and principles are applied to new circumstances and issues, Jihad can have 
different connotations.86 Early Muslims were permitted to engage in armed resistance, but 
only under certain conditions. Fighting and killing in the name of Islam is conditional, 
requiring discrimination of noncombatants from warriors, and prohibiting harm to 
noncombatants. Furthermore, military Jihad is widely interpreted as essentially defensive.87  
Contemporary Islamic thought tends to offer divergent interpretations of the meaning of Jihad 
and its relevance to Muslims, as the concept of Jihad has undoubtedly experienced deep 
alterations over the last 1400 years.88  
“The evolution of jihadi thought is less about changing principles embedded in 
the religious texts than the ways in which these principles are operative in the 
contemporary period.” 89  
Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between the lesser and the greater Jihad.  
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While the lesser Jihad is an external fight, either to promote the spread of Islam, 
Enlightenment, and civility to the dar al-harb (domain of war, meaning regions which are not 
under Islamic control), or to combat an external threat that invades Muslim territory to protect 
the faith and the faithful, comparable to the Judeo-Christian just war theory, the greater Jihad 
focus‟ lies on the struggle of the soul and inner purification.90  
In every case, Jihad is seen as an undeniable duty for a Muslim.91 Nevertheless, there is as 
well a differentiation between the collective duty of Jihad, and the individual duty.  
Collective duties (fard kifayah) are obligations, which could be fulfilled by a group of Muslims 
in the name of the entire community. As long as the group is large enough to succeed in its 
fight, the remaining community is discharged from the duty.  
Individual duties (fard „ayn) are those that each and every Muslim has to fulfil in order to 
avoid falling into sin.92 
While the offensive lesser Jihad is usually understood as a collective duty, the defensive 
lesser Jihad, just as the greater Jihad is seen as an individual duty. To wage a legitimate 
defensive Jihad against a perceived enemy, it is crucial for believing Muslims to verify, that 
the aggressor poses a threat to Islam, to the ummah (the worldwide Muslim community), 
and/or to territories under Islamic influence. Among others, bin Laden argued that the eternal 
struggle to defend Muslims from the disbelievers is justified because of the extensive military 
presence of the United States on the Arabian Peninsula since 1990 and the since then ever 
growing US influence in the Middle East.93 The critical need for a defensive legitimation of the 
Jihad is obvious in hardly every statement of Al Qaeda.  
“We are carrying out the mission of the Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon 
him). The mission is to spread the word of God, not to indulge in massacring 
people. We ourselves are the target of killings, destruction, and atrocities. We 
are only defending ourselves. This is a defensive Jihad. We want to defend 
our people and our land. That is why we say, if we don‟t get security, the 
Americans, too, would not get security. This is the simple formula that even an 
American child can understand. Live and let live.” 94 
Nevertheless, there are seemingly contradictory passages concerning Jihad in the Qur‟an, 
which opens the door for a variety of interpretations that transcended the classical notion. In 
some passages, the Qur‟an expresses tolerance of other faiths, whereas in others, it is 
devotedly hostile to other confessions, if it not purports intolerance and systematic violence 
                                               
90
 (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 83) 
91
 (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 84) 
92
 (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 84) 
93
 bin Laden quoted in (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 85) 
94
 bin Laden quoted in (Wiktorowicz, 2005, p. 86) 
“THE TERRORIST IN A POSTMODERN PERCEPTION”  MICHAEL JOSEF RAAB, BAKK. PHIL 
PAGE | 34  
against infidels…95 In some passages, the Qur‟an even stipulates, though with some 
reservations, that Muslims shall fight against Jews and Christians.96 
As we saw, the concept of Jihad is far more complex, than it seems to be in the first place. 
Essential is the insight, that there are different interpretations of Jihad and its legitimacy. One 
among those is the radical perception of the global Jihadist movement, which justifies its 
terror campaign with the Western presence in Islamic territories. However, as will be 
described more detailed in the chapter “Global Jihad”, this is not the only, not even the 
dominant interpretation of the Qur‟an verses on Jihad.  
MARTYRDOM & SUICIDE 
As we heard before, suicide attacks become more and more important for terror campaigns, 
due to their striking tactical and strategic advantages. However, martyrdom and suicide have 
not always been legitimate tools of Jihad, but where promoted to such over the course of 
time.  
One of the birthplaces of today´s international Islamist terrorism is the Iranian Revolution of 
1979, which turned the country into an Islamic republic based on a fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islamic law.97 The Iranian Revolution has been seen as an example for 
Muslims all over the world to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Qur‟an, according to 
the Shi‟a Islam promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini and to resist the Western - especially the 
United States - intrusion of influence into the Middle East.  
One of the key features of this Shi‟a interpretation of Islam is the neglecting of the legitimacy 
of any secular government.98 According to this rationale, governmental legitimisation can only 
be achieved through the implementation of Islamic law. As Iran was the first country which 
began this redemption, its regime thinks that Iran has to be the advocate for all the other 
oppressed and aggrieved Muslims all over the world.  
“Not only are violence and coercion permissible in order to achieve the 
worldwide spread of Islamic law, but they are also a necessary means to this 
divinely sanctioned end.” 99 
Another important landmark in the uprising of religious terrorism was the successful suicide 
terror campaign of the Hezbollah against the Unites States in Lebanon in the 1980´s, which 
subsequently lead to a withdrawal of US armed forces. This campaign consequently inspired 
other radical groups to adopt the suicide attack tactic not only in the Middle East, but also in 
other parts of the world.100   
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Although suicide is expressly forbidden in the Qur‟an101 and is considered as one of the 
greatest wrong doings a Muslim can commit, suicide terrorism receives increasing 
prominence among Islamist radical groups. The religious legitimacy of suicide terrorism is 
maintained through a semantic distinction, which differentiates suicide.  
While opponents of suicide attacks among the theological scholars focus on the act itself, 
consciously killing oneself, its proponents focus on the intent of the perpetrator.102 One the 
one side is suicide - the taking of one‟s own life because of desperation, weakness or a bleak 
outlook on one owns future - on the other is martyrdom: 
“… in which the perpetrator‟s death is a requirement for the attacks success 
and is thus justified and accepted. Suicide terrorism therefore becomes the 
ultimate expression of selflessness and altruism.” 103  
The distinction consequently targets the motivation for the suicide. In this perception, a 
mujahideen (holy warrior) who kills himself during a suicide mission is imbued with faith in 
Allah‟s grace and generosity, while a suicide takes his life because he is tired of himself and 
Allah.104  
According to these interpretations of Islamic teachings, suicide, or intihar, designates despair 
and violent withdrawal from society, whereas martyrdom, or shahadat, represents the 
ultimate form of giving for the well-being of the community.105  
Two distinct types of shahadat could be distinguished. The first type of shaheed is one who 
gives up his life through Jihad, he is chosen by shahadat. The second type is rebels and 
consciously welcomes death, he chooses his own shahadat.106  
The most revered shaheed was Husayn, who was killed after refusing to avoid a 
confrontation with a superior, though illegitimate regime. This example served as a role 
model for contemporary suicide terrorists, as it introduced shahadat as a way to draw 
attention to injustice so that action can be taken against it.107 Again, the aim of this act was to 
catch attention of a relevant audience, an already mentioned feature of past and present 
terrorism likewise. 
Another common legitimation of suicide attacks is, among others, described by Dr. Eyad 
Sarraj, a Palestinian psychiatrist, who states that suicide terrorists are granted a special 
status in the Islamic community.  
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“A person who would die for his country or tribe is glorified, even sanctified 
and blessed.” 108  
He further cites a passage of the Qur‟an, which is commonly used to underline the 
differentiation between suicide and martyrdom: 
“… and don‟t think that those who are killed in battle for God are dead. Sure 
they are alive and looked after by God.” 109 
The shaheed batal (martyr heroes) are therefore not committing a sin, as they, in the 
understanding of proponents of suicide attacks, are actually not dead, but live further in the 
higher and true life after.110 Not only does this imply that martyrs do not really die, they rather 
are to receive rewards in the afterlife.111 The seven blessings that the martyr is promised are: 
 
 “he is forgiven from the moment his blood is first shed 
 he will be shown his place in Paradise 
 he will be spared the trial of the grave 
 and he will be secure on the Day of the Greatest Terror (the Day of 
Judgement) 
 there will be placed on his head a crown of dignity, one ruby of which is 
better than this world and all that is in it 
 he will be married to seventy-two of al-hoor al-„iyn 
 and he will be permitted to intercede for seventy of his relatives” 112 
 
For a deeply religious individual, these rewards, together with the moral justification of the 
use of violence, could well be a strong motivation force for committing suicide attacks.  
The use of violence is further legitimated by radical theologians and perpetrators of terrorism 
through Sura 2, verses 190-91, which as well was reportedly cited by Sheikh Yassin, founder 
of Hamas and its spiritual leader: 
“Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you… And slay them 
wherever ye find them and drive them out of the place when they drove you 
out, for persecution is worse than slaughter.” 113 
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The four main justifications of suicide attacks are thus:  
 
 “Seeking for Martyrdom 
 Hurting the enemy 
 Encouraging Muslims 
 Weakening the spirit of the enemy” 114 
 
Though there are several passages, which encourage Muslims to fight against their 
perceived enemies, the Qur‟an is replete with enjoinments against killing civilians. Actually, 
nonviolent interpretations of the Qur‟an emphasise numerous pieces of religious evidence to 
argue for a prohibition against targeting noncombatants: 
“Set out for jihad in the name of Allah and for the sake of Allah. Do not lay 
hands on the old verging on death, on women, children and babes. Do not 
steal anything from the booty and collect together all that falls to your lot in the 
battlefield and do good, for Allah loves the virtuous and the pious.” 115 
These kinds of evidences serve as a prohibition against purposely targeting civilians. 
Nevertheless, even moderate interpretations recognise the possibility of civilian casualties in 
violent conflicts, similarly to the Western concept of collateral damage, as an acceptable 
consequence in a legitimate Jihad.116  
Therefore, although Jihadist fighters act under the obligation to do everything possible to limit 
noncombatant casualties, civil casualties are under certain circumstances tolerable. This 
holds true for example, when the enemy is using human shields to cover its forces. In this 
case, the Jihadist is allowed to attack and the responsibility for the civilian victims lies with 
the enemy.117 As the respective excuse for the killing of innocents, civilians or 
noncombatants often serves a verse of the Qur‟an, which was for example cited by Antar 
Zouabri, a leader of the GIA118:  
“I am innocent of those killed because they were associated with those who 
had to be fought.” 119 
Nevertheless, given the vast religious evidence from the Qur‟an emphasising the sanctity of 
life and limiting attacks against noncombatants, Jihadist groups could hardly argue against 
noncombatant immunity. Still, Al Qaeda has definitely broken new ground to develop an 
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expanded understanding about permissible targets in war.120 This expanded interpretation 
meanwhile goes so far, as even civilians, who support the rival government or entity, are 
seen to act as surrogates and representatives of the enemy; thus, they can be directly 
attacked as legitimate targets.121  
Moreover, Jihadists justify targeting non-Muslim civilians one the one hand through the 
doctrine of proportional response, and on the other hand through the argumentation that 
anyone who assists the enemy in any way, even through words, looses the protection of the 
noncombatant status.122   
As mentioned before, although the widely accepted interpretation that targeting of civilians is 
prohibited, it becomes justified if the enemy for instance attacked Muslim civilians.  
“And one who attacks you, attack him in like manner as he attacked you” 123 
In other words, if the enemy uses tactics, which are actually prohibited according to Islamic 
law, these tactics become legal for Muslims when attacking the enemy.  
As numerous interventions of the United States in the past decades as well caused civil 
casualties among the Muslim community (Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, through the support of 
Israel indirectly Palestine as well) Al Qaeda justifies its attacks against noncombatants with 
the proportional response argument.  
The other legitimation rests on the notion that those who stand in the way of Gods aim, which 
is pursuit through Jihad, must be fought. Even noncombatants fall within the circle of 
legitimate targets, if they support the enemy in any way, shall it be through words, deeds, in 
mind or in any other way.124 With this subjective understanding of the capability to fight, even 
NGO´s, journalists, academics, government consultants and business representatives 
become acceptable targets of violence. Especially Al Qaeda uses this subjectivity threshold 
to dramatically broaden the menu of legitimate targets to hardly anyone, who is deemed to 
support the perceived war against Islam.  
This goes as far as the justification of the 9/11 attacks was that a democratically elected 
government reflects the will of the respective people, which therefore could be legitimately 
labelled as enemies of the Islam.125  
As already pointed out, a main difference in the use of violence between religious terrorists 
and their secular counterparts lies in the fact that the later were limited in their use of 
violence through the more or less realistic possibility of becoming part of a legitimate 
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government and terrorism thus was an instrument to achieve a concrete political end,126 
while the former see in violence  
“… a demonstrably divine or transcendental purpose, committed in the service 
or upon the commandment of their own god or religious figures, and therefore 
they feel little need to regulate or calibrate that violence.” 127 
Although there is still an instrumental purpose in violence, it is also often an ends in itself, a 
demonstrably divine and transcendental purpose, committed in the spirit of their god or key 
religious leaders. Because of this divine, afterlife orientated dimension of violence, there is 
no need to calibrate or regulate this violence and some scholars thus completely deny the 
instrumental character of their violence.128  
A striking insight in the Islamist terrorists mind-set delivers a statement of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, the former leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, who was killed 2006 during a joint operation 
of the US Air Force and the Iraqi military.  
“There is no doubt that Allah commanded us to strike the Kuffar (unbelievers), 
kill them, and fight them by all means necessary to achieve the goal. The 
servants of Allah who perform Jihad to elevate the word (laws) of Allah, are 
permitted to use any and all means necessary to strike the active unbeliever 
combatants for the purpose of killing them, snatch their souls from their body, 
cleanse the earth from their abomination, and lift their trial and persecution of 
the servants of Allah. The goal must be pursued even if the means to 
accomplish it affect both the intended active fighters and unintended passive 
ones such as women, children and any other passive category specified by 
our jurisprudence. This permissibility extends to situations in which Muslims 
may get killed if they happen to be with or near the intended enemy, and if it is 
not possible to avoid hitting them or separate them from the intended Kaffirs. 
Although spilling sacred Muslim blood is a grave offense, it is not only 
permissible but it is mandated in order to prevent more serious adversity from 
happening, stalling or abandoning Jihad that is [sic]” 129 
In summary, it can be said that the development of Jihad is characterised mainly by a 
corrosion of the critical constraints, which used to limit Islamic warfare, the intensity of 
violence and the range of possible targets to combatants and their leaders. Furthermore, 
nowadays Jihadists claim that any Muslim who leaves the way of Islam and any leader, who 
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does not implement and follow the Islamic law, is to be regarded as an apostate and thus is a 
legitimate target for attacks. Moreover, the traditional perception that noncombatants and 
civilians must be spared from attacks, is undermined in a way that makes everyone living in a 
Western democracy subject to attack.130  
 
GLOBAL JIHAD 
The phenomenon of special interest within this paper is the global Jihadist movement. 
Therefore, after emphasising the tactical and strategic advantages of terrorism, the following 
paragraphs will deliver some major considerations about this phenomenon on a global level.  
There is no doubt, that Salafism, the ideological root of the jihadi terrorism, of which Al 
Qaeda is the most notable exponent, is profoundly illiberal, in stressing theocracy and 
intolerance of diversity and dissent above democracy, as well as being socially homophobic 
and misogynist.131  
As justification for violence against the West serves its ascribed responsibility for the 
perceived humiliation and oppression suffered by marginalised people throughout the Muslim 
world.132  
Moreover, Al Qaeda is not, as already mentioned, a definable entity like a rogue state, which 
could be spatially isolated. This proponent of radical Jihadism has rather become a diffused 
movement that seeks to draw upon a sense of grievance, humiliation and outrage throughout 
the Islamic world, connecting a range of conflicts to a global struggle.133  
Moreover, this movement already reached the Western states, where Islamist groups 
challenge the prevailing secular, liberal consensus.134  
The already mentioned delocalisation of terror is a phenomenon, which marks the difference 
between the “traditional” terror groups and international terrorism of groups like Al Qaeda. 
The former usually are subnational organisations, which run terror campaigns against a 
perceived enemy state in order to advance limited and well-defined political goals. Such 
goals may be the end of foreign occupation, increased regional autonomy, and self-
determination. These terror organisations have their strongest presence in the respective 
conflict area, recruit their members foremost locally, and traditionally choose targets in the 
conflict area or in close proximity thereof, which is quite obvious because of their regional 
aims.135  
International terrorism, and its most prominent agent Al Qaeda, on the other hand, contrasts 
this traditional, localised phenomenon with the globalisation of martyrdom.136  
Three main characteristics are tied to this phenomenon:  
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First, the new globalised terrorism campaign is deeply transnational in its nature and in its 
aspiration.137 Today‟s terror attacks are planned by globally acting networks, prepared in 
countries far off from disputed regions and attacks not only take place in countries with actual 
conflicts. Even the recruits come from all regions of the world. Adherents of global Jihad do 
not consider themselves as an integral part of their host society. In fact, it is exactly the 
already mentioned alienation from their host society that explains part of their motivation to 
explode themselves along with innocent civilians.138  
The second characteristic of today´s globalised martyrdom is that many terrorists and suicide 
bombers are driven by a humiliation that significantly differs from the concrete grievances of 
traditional suicide bombers. While the grievance of localised suicide bombers is strongly tied 
to personal encounters with occupational forces, to the loss of a close friend or relative or 
similar concrete traumata, this link today is far more complex and perceived grievances are 
rather viscerally, than directly, experienced.139 
The third characteristic of the global Jihad is the central position of the Internet. As 
mentioned before, the World Wide Web plays a crucial role in the indoctrination, training, 
recruitment and radicalisation process of today‟s martyrs. Not only deliver respective 
websites theological justifications and content tools of indoctrination, as the imperative to join 
the Jihad and defend Islam, the Internet as well serves as a virtual meeting and training 
ground for Jihadists to-be.140  
Thus, Al Qaeda is literally the first guerrilla movement in history to migrate from physical 
space to cyberspace.141 More information about this most significant phenomenon is found in 
Nico Pruchas remarkable effort to reveal the activities, structures and techniques of the 
Jihadist online community.142 
The globalisation could therefore well be held responsible for the internationalisation of 
terrorism. The resentment of being left behind of those who do not profit from globalisation 
could lead the marginalised to commit terror attacks to raise their voice against this 
perceived injustice.143  
However, as will be discussed later in this paper, today‟s perpetrators of terrorism are usually 
better educated and more prosperous than the average of their respective society, and are 
not rarely citizens of Western countries. Thus, another approach is probably more accurate.  
International terrorists are rather the products of globalisation, and not those left behind. 
Although they seem to be material beneficiaries of the modern world, they are socially and 
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politically unassimilated, spiritually adrift and caught between traditional values and 
modernity. If at all, they are left behind on a psychological rather than a material level.144  
Even more significant could be the notion, that globalisation, with all its developments, which 
make the world a smaller place, enables terrorism rather than motivating it. Islamist groups, 
who call for a return to the past, are paradoxically quite adept in using the tools of modernity 
like the Internet, international aviation, cell phones and worldwide money transfers.145 The 
special character of globalisation, its structure, its force and its insufficiencies, which were 
indicated at this point, will play a crucial role in the understanding of the social processes, 
which lead to terrorism, and will be further discussed in the chapter “Postmodernism meets 
Terrorism”   
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, one goal of Islamist terrorists, the restoration of the 
Khalifa (the worldwide Caliphate), has about as much chance as the Holy Roman Empire 
suddenly reappearing in Europe. Still, as a rhetoric device, the call for its return exercises a 
powerful grip on bin Laden‟s supporters.146  
The religious rhetoric, not only of Al Qaeda, but of the most religious terrorist groups with 
Islamist background, serves three primary purposes:  
It is first a strong legitimising force. Whenever Al Qaeda attacked civilians, especially Muslim 
civilians, it legitimised its actions by invoking god‟s name.147 Still, for Al Qaeda, killing 
apostate government officials is one thing, attacking ordinary Muslim citizens is something 
entirely different. After massacres among Algerian Muslims in the 1990‟s, committed by the 
GIA, the movement uniformly rejected targeting Muslim civilians, unless they assisted the 
infidels, as this would undermine the overall strategy of Al Qaeda to win the hearts and 
minds of Muslims in its battle against the United States and its supporters.148 Especially the 
argument of the individual duty of defensive Jihad serves as a strong legitimising force, 
which even radical Muslims need to justify the killing of noncombatants.149   
Second, Al Qaeda emphasises the religious nature of Jihad in order to unify its followers. 
The leading figures of the network are very aware of the historical fact, that intra-Muslim 
divisions hindered resistance from the West.150  
Third, Jihadists skilfully use religious rhetoric to motivate their supporters, followers and 
sympathisers to join the global struggle against the perceived enemies of Islam and Allah.151  
“Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are engaged in a defensive jihad against the 
Crusader-Zionist alliance because they believe that the United States have 
made a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims.” 152 
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Freedman describes Islamist terrorism as an ideological threat to liberal values, though not 
comparable to Nazism or Communism, as it is not backed by a powerful state.153 The 
Western image of Jihadist terrorism is that it aims to undermine its values, that terrorists 
pose a threat to democracy, tolerance and freedom, and as they hate the Western population 
because of what “we” are, terrorism is seen as a threat to Western identity rather than 
interests.154 We will have to remember this little, though highly interesting annotation at the 
final part of this paper.   
Still, even within the different streams of Islam, the interpretations of Jihadists are more than 
controversial and contested. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, condemned hardly every 
violent act perpetrated by Al Qaeda.155 Although the Muslim Brotherhood openly supports 
resistance against perceived occupation in Palestine or Iraq, it denounced Al Qaeda‟s mad 
declaration of war against the whole world.156  
This shows us, that every scientific approach to Islamist terrorism has to bear in mind that 
the traditional, localised terror campaigns and terror organisation today coexist with a new, 
globalised pattern of (suicide) terrorism, which is significantly different in some of its 
characteristics. Summarised,  
“The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks represent a transnational, 
highly dynamic, increasingly decentralized, religiously inspired movement 
propelled for the most part by a diverse collection of nonstate actors.” 157 
Nevertheless, although it is odd to declare a war against a diffuse network of extremists or 
against terror itself, which is notably not more than, a tactic, an abstract idea and not an 
identifiable actor, Freedman stresses that international terrorism still poses a serious threat 
to human security, and therefore has to be fought with appropriate deeds.158  
Recapitulating, the global Jihad movement is strongly influenced by the globalisation process 
and in addition highly decentralised and transformed into a diffuse movement, which is using 
the Internet as a virtual meeting point to exchange information, indoctrination and 
propaganda among its members. This transformation, as mentioned at the very beginning of 
this paper, could be seen as a strong indicator for a postmodern character of this movement, 
of which we will hear more in the respective chapter. 
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INSIDE THE ISLAMIST TERRORIST 
Despite the fact, that there are several situations and circumstances, in which it makes sense 
to focus on the operational level of terrorism and understand it as a tactic, while the 
perpetrators themselves and their motivations are left beside,159 the author firmly believes 
that it is important to point the spotlight on the lifeworld of terrorists and to understand 
terrorism as a bigger phenomenon in the context of the contemporary society. Therefore, this 
chapter will be dedicated to the perpetrators of terrorism, their self-perception, their 
motivation, their social contexts and economic opportunities.  
WHO ARE THE PERPETRATORS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM? 
“Terrorists perceive themselves as reluctant warriors, driven by desperation - 
and lacking any viable alternative - to violence against a repressive state, a 
predatory rival ethnic or nationalist group, or an unresponsive international 
order.” 160 
Moreover, a terrorist will never admit that he is a terrorist, actually, terrorists don´t 
understand themselves this way. Religious fundamentalists see themselves as fighters, or 
even as symbols of Islam.161 Instead, the society, the government, the socio economic 
system and its laws or the predominant political system are the true terrorist organisations 
and forces him to fight for his rights or for those of the population he claims to represent. 
“…people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and 
exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force.” 162 
 and further 
“All liberation movements are described as terrorists by those who have 
reduced them to slavery.” 163 
This view is not surprisingly consistent with the observation of the subjective nature of the 
attribution process of the label terrorist, which we introduced some pages before. This little 
evidence will re-employ us later on and serve as a key factor in the promotion of a 
postmodern approach to the phenomenon of terrorism.  
But before that, we shall illuminate different self-ascriptions and contexts of perpetrators of 
terrorism.   
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Generally spoken, the terrorist is fundamentally, because he is not pursuing purely 
egocentric goals like grievance or personal needs, an altruist:164   
“… he believes that he is serving a good cause designed to achieve a greater 
good for a wider constituency - whether real or imagined - that the terrorist and 
his organization purport to represent.” 165 
What all terrorists as well have in common is their orientation on the future. They 
imperturbable believe that there will be a point in time, when they will assuredly triumph over 
their enemies and attain the ultimate realisation of their self-chosen political destiny. Whether 
it is the implementation of Gods, Allah´s or Jahwe´s will on earth, their national self-
determination or the achieving of any other goal, the terrorist is convinced of the inevitability 
of his victory. This conviction is based on the subjective perception of the innate 
righteousness of their cause.166   
Despite the described altruism and the dominant future orientation, there does not appear to 
be a single terrorist personality. In addition, and what the author will extensively show later in 
this part, terrorists are not diagnosable psychopathic or mentally sick. Although there are 
contributions, which argue that especially suicide bombers are brainwashed into seeking 
martyrdom via self-immolation for a political cause with promises of heavenly rewards and 
display unmistakably millennial thinking,167 the average terrorist is actually quite sane, 
although often deluded by an ideological or religious way of viewing the world.168 
Nevertheless, it seems that people with particular personality traits and tendencies, which 
are action-orientated, aggressive, stimulus-hungry and excitement seeking with narcissistic 
tendencies and low self-esteems, are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers.169 
Beside these possible features, terrorists are in general practically indistinguishable from 
ordinary people in terms of his outward appearance.170 
While different disciplines approach the phenomenon of radicalisation and terrorism in 
significant different ways, most scholars nowadays agree that to answer the question, why 
some people become terrorists, a trans-disciplinary and multidimensional approach is 
needed.171 Such an approach shall be introduced in this chapter.  
In general, the causes of revolution and political violence are also assumed to be causes of 
terrorism. These causes include ethnic conflicts, religious and ideological conflicts, poverty, 
modernisation stresses, political inequities, lack of peaceful communication channels, 
traditions of violence, the existence of a revolutionary group, governmental weakness and 
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ineptness, erosions of confidence in a regime, and deep divisions within governing elites and 
leadership groups. 172 We will hear of some of these factors later on, while others will turn out 
to not hold true the cited empirical evidence.  
Helmus sees a major issue in the genesis from an ordinary individual to a terrorist in the 
distinction between trigger factors, which lead an individual towards becoming a terrorist, and 
factors, which keep him to maintain his participation in the terrorist organisation.173 Further,  
“… it should be emphasized that a psychological movement to terrorism is not 
a discrete choice. In this context, individuals generally do not make a single 
decision to “become” a terrorist. Rather, progression toward violent behaviour 
is gradual.” 174  
In this sense, radicalisation is more like a process. Within this process, individuals are moved 
forward by a complex interaction of factors, which well may include socialisation, exposure to 
rewards, and other environmental influences.175 
When trying to identify several key factors, which make it more likely for an individual to 
undergo a process of radicalisation, Helmus describes the labels 
 
 Radicalising social groups 
 Desire for change 
 Desire to respond to grievance 
 Perceived rewards176 
 
It seems as if terrorism and the destruction it unleashes are fed and sustained by an ever-
willing cadre of new recruits. Despite ten years of international efforts to stem the 
omnipresent threat of terrorism, attacks in Iraq, Israel, USA and in Europe suggest a more 
than adequate supply of willing recruits.177 We now shall have a look, where these volunteers 
come from and how they radicalise from ordinary people to perpetrators of terrorism.  
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RADICALISING SOCIAL GROUPS 
Terrorism could well be seen as a rational strategic course of action decided on by a group. 
Terrorism is rarely committed by an individual, although the lone-wolf phenomenon gains 
more and more importance today. Rather, acts of terrorism are committed by groups, who 
reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs.178 A communal groups capacity 
for political action, including violent forms, depends on the salience of group identity and 
shared incentives.179 Thus, social groups have a crucial impact on the attitudes, beliefs and 
commitment to action of their respective members. Especially important aspects among 
these social-psychological processes that influence individuals are the in-group/out-group 
biases, conformity, compliance, groupthink, polarisation and diffusion of responsibilities.180  
The in-group/out-group biases, which are commonly observed instruments in obtaining group 
cohesion, play a special role in the radicalisation process as well.  
“It is quintessentially human to divide people and places into categories and to 
separate them into us and them to make sense of a complex world.” 181 
Groups tend to view themselves positively, while considering outsiders rather negatively. 
Terrorist groups, which demonise or dehumanise outsiders have a reduced threshold of 
perpetrating acts of violence against these outsiders.182  
Further, groups tend to deliver expectations for individual beliefs and conduct that result in 
shifting individual attitudes, opinions, and behaviours in favour of group norms in order to 
guarantee conformity in the group.183 
Increased compliance with group requests and obedience to orders is cultivated in groups 
through high group cohesion, increased cost of defiance, isolation from other groups and the 
degree to which the group satisfies individual needs. These factors increase the likelihood 
and severity of group conformity.184  
Groups commonly engage in huge efforts to reach agreement or consensus, which could 
result in flawed judgements on the part of individuals. The individual will gets, to a certain 
extent, replaced by the groupthink.  
In addition, group interaction tends to polarise individual attitudes to the extreme. 
Finally, the responsibility for group action is spread over all members of the group, which is 
especially important when regarding group violence against outsiders and radical ideology. 
Thus, the individuals‟ perception of personal responsibilities for specific actions is limited.185  
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At this point, it is worth mentioning, that although the outcome of decision processes within a 
terrorist group may well be different from the respective outcome of an ordinary group, the 
decision process itself is quite the same. May it be a single leader or a non-hierarchical 
discussion that delivers decisions for the group, as most members of terrorist groups 
resemble members of the general population and could therefore be considered as rational 
actors, even terrorist groups could be well expected to make rational choices according to 
their beliefs, interests and goals.186  
After these explications, it is not surprising that networks of friends and/or relatives, 
accompanied with group dynamics such as peer pressure and intra-group affection are 
instrumental in the radicalisation process of individuals and groups as well.187   
Professional terrorist recruiters use the described group socialisation processes in mosques, 
summer camps, or even in private homes to find potential candidates. These candidates are 
invited to smaller gatherings or even to one-on-one conversations, where motivation and 
qualification are assessed and potential participants are selected.188  
Nevertheless, there are more informal ways of recruitment as well. A considerable proportion 
of recruiting happens through personal indoctrination in the immediate circle of friends and in 
the respective family. Another phenomenon, which has to be mentioned in this context, is the 
radicalisation in bottom up peer groups, which is not rarely made responsible for the 
decentralisation of Al Qaeda and the transformation of Salafism into a broad social 
movement.189  
As already mentioned, the medium at hand for the radicalisation and indoctrination, 
especially among young peer groups, is the Internet. The World Wide Web provides a venue 
where radicals post and share training material, ideological manifestos, radicalised e-
magazines, and videos illustrating attacks on the declared enemy, the United States and its 
armed forces.190 These data sets deliver crucial information to would-be recruits and are 
used among pertinent individuals and groups as a key source of ideology. In blogs, wiki-
lexica and social networks, like-minded individuals can interact and develop mutually 
supportive relationships.191 The Internet thus may serve as a meeting point and as a potential 
source for recruiting, just as a mosque or a club would do. In addition, the Internet creates a 
nearly egalitarian room, where everyone‟s voice has nearly the same weight and thereby it 
encourages participation of individuals, whose inhibition threshold probably would be too 
high in reality.   
However, although the Internet could serve as an effective propaganda and recruiting 
machinery for terrorist groups, it is arguable whether it could establish valuable new links 
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from scratch.192 As every other virtual network, extremist networks work at their best when 
they are backed and combined with real social linkages in special localised communities.  
The decision to advance from discussions within the group to commit attacks is based on the 
belief, that action will positively influence relevant audiences and the belief that action will 
advance the respective group goals and interests.193 
In addition, the belief that action will produce positive reactions inside the respective group 
and the acceptability of the risks associated with acting play a crucial role as well.194 
Notably, the risk is usually compared with the expected achievements of the action, which 
strongly suggests a rational choice in the group‟s decision-making, of which we will hear 
more later on. The transition to violence, or the choice of terrorism versus other methods of 
protest, of groups is denoted through the following characteristics: 
 
 “The intensity with which the group delegitimizes its opponents 
 the absence of moral inhibitions or antiviolence taboos in the groups culture 
 members previous experience with violence 
 whether the group has rationally assessed the risks and opportunities of 
violent action 
 the level of its organizational, financial, and political resources  
 the groups sense of imminent threat 
 competition with other groups 
 the age of the activists involved, where younger groups are more likely to 
turn to violence 
 any external influence or manipulation of the group toward violence or 
support that makes the transition to violence easier 
 a sense on the part of the group of humiliation and the need to take 
revenge 
 the leader`s past experience with violence” 195 
 
To sum up, the process of radicalisation and the advancement to violent action is highly 
linked to intra-group processes in reality as well as in cyberspace. Nevertheless, the 
processes within radicalising social groups cannot alone be responsible for the emerge of 
terror. An additional motivation force is the desire for change. 
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DESIRE FOR CHANGE 
Some terrorist recruits feel the vigorous desire to trigger a fundamental change in their 
environment. These desired changes are often related to the objectives of the terrorist 
organisation or to the broader movement they want to participate in.  
Nevertheless, it seems that social bonds and personal inducement are more important in 
motivating participation than ideological commitment.196 
The main targets for desired change can be subdivided in political, religious and legal goals.  
Political goals could be the wish to overthrow the capitalist social and economic system197 or 
the desire for an independent state or to remove a perceived occupying power from a 
territory. Although in regions like Lebanon, Palestine or Sri Lanka, suicide terrorism was and 
still is often a response to perceived occupation and is designed to coerce governments into 
making territorial concessions198, it is quite arguable whether (post)modern terrorism can be 
explained as easy as that.  
Especially in the vocabulary of Al Qaeda, which often justifies its attacks with the occupation 
of Muslim territory, occupation not merely means the presence of military troops, but a much 
more loosely defined concept - a laundry list of historically accrued injustices currently 
manifested in the military, religious, political, economic, and cultural influence that the West 
is perceived to exert on the larger Muslim world, thereby humiliating it.199 These perceived 
injustices again serve as strong indicator for a postmodern shift in international terrorism.  
The wish to implement religious related changes is another motivating set. Especially 
Islamist motivated organisations seek to build a worldwide and united Muslim community, 
organised as a Caliphate based on the Islamic law, the Sharia.200  
There are also some individuals or groups, which desire to change a single and focused 
issue, like environmental rights or abortion rights.  
Although this motivation for terrorism is very fascinating and more than up to date, it is rather 
located at the borders of the topic of interest; hence it will not be discussed further in this 
paper.  
The perceived feeling of discrimination, on the other hand, significantly contributes to the 
radicalisation process and could serve as a powerful motivator for participating in terrorist 
acts, as it can facilitate a sense of alienation.201  
“Discrimination and other perceived injustices that are perpetrated by 
governing authorities may promote a sense that those regimes should be 
removed.” 202 
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As we disused, political, religious and legal factors, which do not correspond to an individuals 
or an organisations ideology, in accordance with perceived discrimination and/or alienation 
could lead to radicalisation and a desire for change. If the democratic institutions are weak 
and the use of violence is regarded as a legitimate means to gain attention, these factors 
could play a critical role to understand the path of an individual to become a perpetrator of 
terrorist acts.  
In addition, many of nowadays martyrs are second and third generation Muslim immigrants 
who live in larger cities of Western Europe. Because of their experience that the stubborn 
European nationalism leaves little space or opportunities for them to fully integrate together 
with the phenomenon of deterritorialisation of Islam, meaning weak or non-existent relations 
to their origin country, deepens the sense of humiliation and alienation and further supports 
the radicalisation process.203  
   
DESIRE TO RESPOND TO GRIEVANCE 
The desire to respond to personal or collective perceived grievance as well appears to be a 
powerful motivational force for individuals to radicalise and participate in terrorism.204  
Revenge or vengeance for personally perceived injustices and abuse, or the perceived duty 
to defend members of an identifiable social group,205 plays a critical role for perpetrators of 
terrorism, as many who enter terrorism report from personal abuse or abuse of a close 
relative through an occupying force or government authorities. Terrorism serves these 
perpetrators as a tool to exact revenge against the instigators of perceived injustice.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that although a significant part of civilians in relevant 
regions have experienced such abuses, only a very small percentage seek terrorism as a 
last resort to digest these experiences.206   
Collective grievance in comparison refers to perceived problems of an identifiable social 
group.  
“Often, individuals increasingly identify with a social group whom they see as 
subject to unjust policies or actions. In the case of Islamic extremism, radicals 
increasingly identify with their Muslim heritage and the broader Muslim 
community.” 207  
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Because of this identification, it is not always essentially necessary for perpetrators of 
terrorism to have experienced abuses or injustices on their own, but the discriminatory 
practices unjustly affecting the community could already serve as a motivating factor to 
engage in terrorism.  
“The doctrine and idea of global defensive jihad against aggressors attacking 
Islam and Muslims stands out as the single most important motivational factor 
at the group level.” 208 
Terrorist organisations use this collective grievance to mobilise a steady flow of new recruits. 
Their propaganda material is packed with images and reports of atrocities committed against 
Muslims living around the globe. Once again, the Internet serves as the medium at hand to 
spread worst-case scenarios through the ummah, the worldwide Muslim community. 
“The mortality salience effect refers to a series of research findings that 
suggest that exposure to such imagery has a number of pronounced effects, 
including increased pride in one‟s country, religion and race.” 209  
Unsurprisingly, the process of identification plays a central role in facilitating the concept of 
collective grievance. The mechanism of identification brings with it a sense of responsibility 
for helping Muslims who are threatened by an external power, even if the perpetrators of 
terror never met them.210  
Especially interesting in the context of radicalisation and the commitment to terrorist attacks 
is the fact that within the Muslim community, there exists a hierarchy of identities, where the 
religious identity superseded the ethnic and national identity. Particular important is the 
related finding that Muslim identity is positively correlated with the perceived importance of 
Jihad and martyrdom.211 
 
PERCEIVED REWARDS 
Based on the paradigm of behaviourism, which postulates that consequences influence 
behaviour and the idea of rational choice, that assets that individuals choose the best action 
according to stable preferences, it is high likely that  
“… both real and expected consequences motivate terrorist participation.” 212 
Helmus identifies as possible positive consequences religious rewards, social status, 
financial rewards, friendship and excitement.213  
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In the context of Islamist terrorism, the most significant religious reward is martyrdom, which 
has been discussed in detail before. 
“The perceived benefits associated with a martyr´s afterlife include forgiveness 
of the martyr´s sins, access to heaven and communion with God, the ability to 
guarantee access to paradise for 70 relatives or friends, and the belief that the 
martyr will be greeted in heaven to enjoy the sexual pleasure of 72 virgins.” 214 
The concept of martyrdom and its promised rewards result in the ideological notion that 
fighting the perceived enemies of Islam fulfils a divinely inspired imperative. Using terrorism 
and violence to fulfil this imperative is seen as the only option due to the military superiority 
of the Western enemies.  
The role of increased social status must not be underestimated as well, especially in the 
phase of motivating new recruits for terrorist campaigns. In Palestine, for example, popular 
support for terrorist attacks reached up to 70% in 2001.215 This support is manifested in 
ritualised pomp and circumstance for suicide bombers, who are seen as heroic soldiers for a 
good cause.216  
“Social applause can reach its peak after a suicide bombers death, where 
posters, Web sites, and public exhibits pay homage to the martyr. Mourning 
ceremonies provide further veneration of the dead.” 217 
One could argue, that an increased social status is useless for an individual, who will be 
dead after a successful suicide operation. Still, we have to consider that not all terrorist 
attacks are suicide operations. Moreover, the social status of a successful martyr is 
transferred to his relatives and surviving dependents as well, which could be a strong 
motivating factor in societies with distinctive kinship ties.  
Although the impact of financial rewards is not generally clear, it is worth mentioning that for 
example, some members of Al Qaeda used to receive regular salaries for their efforts in the 
network.218  
In addition, it is quite common that families of terrorists‟ killed in action receive financial 
contributions from the respective terror organisation.219  
However, the effect of these rewards is unclear, as suicide bombers not generally come from 
impoverished families. On top, there is no evidence that, in the case of Palestine for 
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example, there is a significant relation between the pace of terrorist action and economic 
indicators.220  
As mentioned earlier, the close relationship and the intergroup dynamics friendships foster 
are often fundamental to the radicalisation process.221 As terrorist organisation usually seek 
to isolate their members from the broader community, they even more have to rely on the 
intergroup relationships. It seems self evident that strong group ties promote participation in 
terrorist attacks, once you are in the “inner circle”.  
Excitement is probably an arguable point, but there are strong indicators that this factor plays 
a role in the recruitment and reward process as well. In general,  
“Psychological research with nonterrorist subjects strongly suggests that 
exciting activities are perceived as rewarding by a significant subset of the 
general population.” 222 
Recruitment videos reportedly highlight the exciting side of terrorism, portraying training 
videos with weapons and footage of different operations.223 Along with the other portrayed 
rewards of participating in terrorism could excitement be an additional factor, especially for 
young male with a monotonous daily routine and a grim prospect of their future as it is 
predominant in certain territories like in Palestinian refugee camps for example.  
 
SUPPORTING TERRORISM 
It is quite obvious, that any organisation, who seeks to run and maintain a terrorist campaign 
needs the support of a significant part of the respective society in order to be adequately 
supplied with manpower, funding, material, sanctuaries, intelligence, and to receive a 
principle tolerance of activities.224  
When discussing support, it is important to differentiate between the expression of sympathy 
and the material support, aid and abetment of terrorism.225 Although these concepts are 
overlapping, they must not be seen as equivalent.  
The reasons for supporting terrorism are quite similar to those that cause participation in 
terrorism, which we have discussed above. The crucial difference between providing support 
for and participating in terrorism lies in the nature of the activity. Whereas former is restricted 
to the above-mentioned actions, the later means a concrete engagement in a certain attack 
or campaign.   
Paul divides the individual reasons for support in contextual factors, factors based on social 
or cultural processes and motives resulting directly from the actions of a terrorist group.226  
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Contextual factors could be:  
 
 “Humiliation, intolerable frustration, alienation, and hatred 
 repression and occupation 
 lack of regime legitimacy, lack of opportunity for political expression, and 
lack of political freedom 
 desire for resistance/action by proxy/”public good” (including self-defence) 
 social movements (including ideology) 
 grievances” 227 
 
As said before, these factors seem to be quite similar to those factors, which are responsible 
for participating in terrorist campaigns and which were discussed above. Hence, they will not 
be repeated at this point.  
The motivating factors stemming from cultural or social processes are summarised by Paul 
as: 
 
 “identity processes 
 kinship or fictive kinship ties, including tribal motivations 
 cultural and social obligations 
 revenge 
 normative acceptability of violence 
 cost-benefit calculations 
 misperception and self deception” 228 
 
Again, some of these factors, like identity processes, revenge, and the normative 
acceptability of violence sound familiar to us. We heard of them when discussing the 
motivational factors of individuals participating in terrorism and earlier when talking about 
terrorism in general.  
Of a special importance seems to be the identity process in communities and groups again:  
“… (the) perception of an external threat is the most reliable source of in-group 
cohesion and associated idealization of in-group values and support for in-
group leaders. This creates a more explicit causal pathway for some of the 
contextual factors identified above that lead to support.” 229 
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The perception of the status of the group, or the ethnic or religious community one is part of 
in a certain area plays a crucial role in the support of terrorism. Muslim perception of their 
status in a country highly contributes to their views about Islamist militancy as a solution.230  
Moreover, Identity provides a reinforcing feedback loop for terrorism in both directions. A 
successful terrorist attack is a symbolic act inspiring solidarity among its supporters and 
promotes unification of identity among the victims as well.231  
Kinship ties are probably the strongest form of shared identity. Such ties could trigger similar 
processes like identity, but are mobilised more easily, as attachment to kin is much more 
constant than political or ethnic identity.232  
Fictive kinship can actually be as powerful as actual blood or marriage ties. Cultures with a 
strong sense of community belonging construct together with a distinct Islamic ideology of 
shared religious beliefs and practices the idea of an worldwide Islamic brotherhood of 
believers.233 This kinship is used to justify terrorism against perceived enemies of this 
community, even if the supporter himself never suffered from injustices, occupation or other 
key factors for supporting terrorism. This evidence suggest that cultural identities - those 
based on common descend, experience, language and belief - may tend to be stronger and 
more enduring than most civic and associational identities.234 
Cultural and social obligations are manifold, and some of them have already been discussed 
earlier in this paper. The point is that there could be a complicit surround235 where individuals 
in a community are exposed to a host of assumptions, conditions, and obligations that make 
supporting a- or participating in a terrorist organisation more likely, if not unavoidable or even 
natural.236 
This assumption is strongly tied to the factor of the normative acceptability of violence. As 
mentioned earlier, the normative acceptability of violence not only plays a crucial role in 
participating in terrorism, but also in supporting it. Brought to the point, the social acceptance 
of violence lowers the entry cost for participation or support and lowers the barriers to 
identifying with terrorist action and thus with terrorists themselves.237   
Several factors could contribute to calculated decisions to support terrorism in a cost-benefit 
calculation. Besides monetary incentives, which we already heard of, there are factors like 
the desire to earn recognition within an identity group, the support for the side, which is 
believed to win, or the prospects for cooperation, which are reduced as the probability of 
future interaction decreases.238  
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The cost-benefit calculation presupposes an actor who comes to a decision through a 
rational choice. This assumption is important, regarding the first hypothesis of this paper and 
will be discussed in the respective chapter.  
The misperception and self-deception could play a role especially if the terrorist organisation 
is providing critical services and/or is engaging in successful propaganda.  
As support, which is motivated by direct activities of the terrorist group, Paul identifies: 
 
 “intimidation 
 propaganda efforts 
 provision of social services 
 identification with the group (shared ideology, goals and legitimacy) 
 excessive civil casualties or other inacceptable group behaviour 
 corruption or penetration of the state” 239 
 
Intimidation can be particular effective in generating passive support, which means the 
ignorance of evidence of terrorism.240 
We as well already heard of propaganda, which is nowadays spread especially through the 
Internet. Propaganda can be used to mobilise or leverage many of the contextual factors in a 
certain culture or society and is thus an important element in strategic communication and 
considerations.241  
The provision of social services in areas under control, or which are desired to become under 
the control of a terrorist organisation, has been found to be very effective in generating 
positive opinions, endorsement, and support.242 
Identification with the ideology, the goals or the social or religious practices of a terrorist 
group is a strong social process, as we discussed earlier. Through propaganda and 
promotion can the legitimacy of the group be increased.  
Unacceptable group behaviour not necessarily has to be tied to violence, hardly anything, 
that alienates the population from the group or works to sever existing identity ties will 
decrease prospects for support. Thus, the character of group behaviour or the amount of civil 
casualties of their attacks have to be within the acceptable bandwidth of the supporting 
society if the group wants to prevent a decrease of their legitimacy. 
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Corruption or the penetration of the state is an important source of support, as it allows these 
groups to siphon resources directly from the state into their own coffers.243 In addition, a 
penetrated administration is less likely to pursue terrorist organisations in their country by all 
available means.  
After this short discussion of primarily motivational factors, we shall turn to possible root 
causes of terrorism, before we try to draw a first tentative picture of the Islamist terrorist.   
 
ARE ROOT CAUSES ENOUGH? 
After every discussion about terrorism in general, and religious terrorism, especially the 
phenomenon of Jihadism, in particular. The obvious first question often is, how should the 
modern society and the international institutions face terrorism in order to save the life of 
potential victims of violent attacks? One approach is to identify and fight the root causes of 
terrorism, figuratively speaking, to get down to the root of the trouble. At the first glimpse, this 
sounds like quite a good approach, but as so often when theoretical approaches have to face 
reality, the targeted phenomenon is rather complex.  
First of all, root causes are not the proximate cause of terrorism. Rather, they are factors that 
establish an environment in which terrorism may arise. Such factors may be political and 
economic (structural), but may also reflect the pervasive characteristics of culture and 
relevant sub-groups.244  
Noricks draws a basic distinction line of root causes between permissive and precipitant 
factors.245 While the former prepare the ground for terror, the later represent the 
miscellaneous sparks that trigger terrorism. Therefore, permissive factors have to be seen as 
preconditions, which allow certain ideologies to grow in a society and provide a social 
environment, a pool of potential recruits and widespread grievances out of which terrorism 
could emerge. Precipitant factors could be certain events or incidents, which catalyse the 
latent grievance and anger and thereby provoke a change in behaviour. Precipitant factors 
represent a window of opportunity, where a significant incident could lead to violent 
behaviour and terrorism.246   
In general, there could be identified at least three major permissive factors, which, if 
dominant in a society, could lead to terrorism. These three are global systemic factors, state 
structural factors (perceived illegitimacy of the regime, repression, democracy, 
modernisation, economics) and social and cultural factors (education, human insecurity, 
grievances and anxieties, mobilising structures and social ties, ideology, culture, religion).247  
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Global systemic factors understand terrorism as a consequence of event dynamics over a 
period of time.248 As historical waves of terrorism could be identified the anti-empire, anti-
colonisation, anti-Western and the current, religion-based wave.  
Global systemic factors lead to the assumption that terrorism is a by-product of broader 
historical shifts in the international distribution of power in its political, economic, military, 
ideological and cultural forms.249 This argument will be discussed extensively in the 
upcoming chapter about Postmodernism, and will serve as a main argument for the papers‟ 
conclusion.  
State structural factors include social, political and economic characteristics of society.  
Political factors, which are often used to explain the rise of terrorism are perceived 
illegitimacy of the regime, repression, democracy and modernisation. 
The de-legitimation of state institutions often occurs during a period of political and social 
change within a society.250 Weak states are no longer able to mobilise sufficient resources for 
reform and thus deliver a fertile ground for violent oppositions and rebellion. Processes, 
which could lead to de-legitimation could be the regime support for unpopular economic, 
social or cultural institutions, evidence of corruption, weak infrastructural power, the 
exclusion of mobilised groups from political participation, and the use of indiscriminate 
violence.251  
Another significant contribution for leading an opposing group to violent behaviour is 
government repression. The use of violence against the own citizens is not only a key 
mechanism for state de-legitimation and for the alienation of its citizens, but moreover serves 
as a legitimating force promoting the use of violence overall.252  
Furthermore are, relatively spoken, young democracies most likely to experience terrorism. 
As they are often lacking the already mentioned strong institutions and moreover could be 
perceived as imposed upon Islamic states by Western hegemonic forces. In addition, the, in 
democracies predominant, civil rights lower the costs of terrorism due to the freedom of 
movement, the easy access to government buildings and the legal restraints on government 
actions in countering terrorism.253  
The modernisation force is thought to be a similar promoter of turbulence and social 
instability as well as to be a state de-legitimating factor.254 Processes like social and political 
change that accompany economic evolution often lead to the breakup of the traditional 
family, job loss and weakened community ties.255 As already mentioned, the relationship 
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between terrorism and modernisation might best be described in terms of the effects of 
feelings of desperation, loss of valued traditions and relationships and general anxiety.256   
The role of economic factors is highly disputed among scientific contributions. Nevertheless, 
contrary to popular belief, poverty, whether on the individual or the community level, is barely 
capable to serve as an explanation for terrorism.257 
The same is true for the social factor of education. If there is any correlation between the 
education level of a society and terrorism, it seems to be a positive one. Education can 
encourage terror in several ways. Schools could serve as convenient recruiting hubs or 
mobilising structures, which promote violent ideology. Thus, the role of education has to be 
strongly tied to the predominant culture, ideology and religion of a society. 258  
Human insecurity includes a low level of civil liberties, poor political rights, high levels of 
crime, low levels of education and health care is often suggested as contributing to terrorism 
and could well serve as motivational factors for perpetrators of terrorism.  
Grievances and Anxieties, as we heard before, could as well lead to terrorism. While they are 
usually related to long-standing or historical grievances, like inequality, humiliation, revenge, 
alienation, despair, and impotence, they often need precipitating trigger events, which are 
significant enough for the individual to engage in violent actions.259  
Finally, ideology, religion and culture are probably the most disputed factors estimated to 
cause terrorism. Although the immediate relation between these factors and the occurrence 
of terrorism is not at all definite, there is a wide consensus that violent behaviour is a 
consequence of violent socialisation.260  
As already mentioned before. the use of violence and terrorism as a legitimate means to 
pursuit specific political, social or religious goals has to rest upon a normative justification for 
violence within the respective collective. In the chapter on Jihad, the religious justification for 
attacks against the perceived enemies of Islam has already been presented.  
Nevertheless, it is crucial to repeat that although religion is not completely innocent, as it 
provides ideology, motivation and often as well the organisational structure, religion does not 
lead to violence by itself. Religion rather has to be combined with movements for social or 
political change, in which the use of violence is reinterpreted as justified, to lead to violent 
attacks.261   
After this short introduction of possible root causes, which not surprisingly often overlap with 
the already discussed motivational factors, it is important to mention that in most arguments, 
it is state weakness and social instability that really creates the political space for violence, 
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terror and insurgency262. Therefore, these permissive factors have to gain a special attention 
in the examination of terrorism´s root causes.  
The following factor tree summarises these predominantly permissive factors and organises 
them in an arguable hierarchy and chain of consequences.  
 
263 
Factor trees like this one remind us of the complexity of multi-dimensional phenomenon like 
terrorism and allow us to systematically examine different levels of decisions and contexts. 
The author explicitly recommends the cited RAND publication for a more detailed and 
structured examination of terrorism, which delivers, at least on the tactical and strategic level, 
a profound ground for further research.   
“As a whole, Figure S.1 is to be read as saying that whatever role root causes 
play in the phenomenon of terrorism, the likelihood that terrorism will ensue as 
a result of root causes will increase if the social group in question believes that 
violence is legitimate (even if others see it as terrorism), if it has substantial 
motivations (perhaps stemming from grievances) and if social structures exist 
permitting the terrorist actions.” 264 
Nevertheless, terrorism cannot simply be explained exclusively in terms of root causes. This 
would suggest a mechanistic approach to social interactions, which is widely discarded in 
recent scientific contributions. Although root causes doubtless can serve as motivation 
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factors for terrorism, violent organisations could as well misuse these factors and see them 
as opportunities for the advancement of their goals.265  
In addition, as we heard already in the section concerning with radicalising social groups, 
groups facing similar conditions choose different responses, depending on the intra-group 
processes and the respective contexts, and terrorism is just one of those responses.   
“Terrorism is not a spontaneous reaction to circumstances.” 266 
After this first summary of the complex and numerous factors influencing the terrorist, we 
shall proceed to discuss the rationality of terrorists‟ activities. Through discarding the 
mechanistic cause and effect approach, which would solely rely on root causes and social 
contexts, and underscoring the rationality of the terrorists behaviour, committing terror 
attacks should be understood as conscious decisions and thus promote the assumption, that 
terrorists are rationally actors. As will be further elaborated, this assumption is crucial to draw 
a more accurate picture of the Islamist terrorist, than the one widely reproduced in popular 
belief.    
 
THE RATIONALITY OF TERRORISTS 
Despite the numerous arguments, root causes and motivational forces, which could lead 
individuals to conduct terrorist activities, their actions could still be regarded as irrational or 
as desperate cries of mentally-disordered psychopaths, thus de-legitimising them and their, 
though doubtless cruel, but still significant actions.  
“… it is probably conventional wisdom that people become terrorists because 
of some combination of economic conditions, educational attainment, religious 
zealotry, or mental illness. They lack the knowledge or ability to make 
reasoned decisions, or they are in such desperate circumstances as to seek 
extreme measures.” 267 
Nevertheless, a large body of recent empirical work, optimistically just as the paper at hand, 
disconfirms the underlying notion: 
“Terrorists are not particularly poor, ignorant, mentally ill, or religious. Their 
most notable characteristic is normalcy” 268 
As already mentioned, the widespread opinion, that poverty and lack of education269 were 
root causes of terrorism, seems not to hold true due to recent scientific evidence. On the 
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informal level of evidence, several contributions portrayed perpetrators of terrorism as 
educated persons with mid-class professions and a certain wealth.270  
Jodie Wilgoren described the 9/11 hijackers as follows: 
“They were adults with education and skill… [who] spent years studying and 
training in the United States…” 271 
After interviewing approximately 250 terrorists and associates, Nasra Hassan summarised 
2001: 
“None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or 
depressed. Many were middle-class and, unless they were fugitives, held 
paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. 
Two were the sons of millionaires.” 272 
Scott Atran reported 2003 in the New York Times: 
“Officials with the Army Defense Intelligence Agency who have interrogated 
Saudi-born members of Al Qaeda being detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 
have told me that these fundamentalists, especially those in leadership 
positions, are often educate above reasonable employment level; a surprising 
number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families.” 273 
One scientific contribution among others, which denies that economic grievance is a 
significant root of supporting terrorism, is found in Beck (2009): 
“… in fact, those who support religious mobilization are often from higher 
educational and socioeconomic backgrounds.” 274 
Accounts like this lead among other evidence to more scientific considerations of this 
controversial issue.  
Berrebi states that the empirical evidences collected so far give little reason to postulate that 
improving education and the economic situation of individuals would decrease their desire to 
engage in terrorist campaigns.275 
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“If anything, the findings suggest that those with higher educational attainment 
and higher living standards are more likely to participate in terrorist activity.” 276 
Based on these findings, one could argue that although those, who actively engage in 
terrorism, received a surpassing education and are wealthier than the average population, 
participate in terrorist campaigns because of poverty in their country or among their 
respective social in-group. The strong, even though fictive kinship ties, we heard about 
before, strongly suggest this hypothesis. However, literature on terrorism typically suggests 
that macroeconomic conditions have little if anything to do with the amount of terrorism in a 
certain area.277  
While indicators of economic development have little impact on the arise of terrorism, 
variables like population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state repression, and, most 
significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be reliable predictors of terrorism.278  
Another common variable to predict or at least explain terrorism is religion.  
First of all, it is important to mention that none of the major religions has a monopoly on 
terrorism, countries with very different religious faiths have all experienced terrorism, as 
target, origins, and hosts.279 
Further do we have to clarify, that: 
“Although religion in popular discourse has been suggested as an important 
determinant of terrorist activity, empirical evidence tells a different story… the 
nature of this linkage does not appear to be clear, as both a negative and a 
positive connection between spiritual ideology and terrorism can be detected.” 280 
On top of that, dealing with religious terrorism could be confusing, as organisations could use 
religious arguments to attract a wider audience, while actually pursuing secular goals.281 
Therefore, although religion definitely could be a powerful source for encouraging individuals 
to support or engage in terrorism, relying solely on religion-based explanations would leave a 
blind spot in our understanding of terrorism.282    
Another important factor in the perception of the terrorist is the ascription of irrationality and 
mental illness.283 The question here is whether there is an intrinsic rationality in terrorist´s 
behaviour, which would enable the use of a rational choice model, or if terrorists are 
disproportionately mentally ill, which would make the search for indicators of rational choices 
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pointless. This section is especially important regarding to the working hypothesis H1, as the 
ascribed rationality of terrorists, or the lack of it, is assumed to be a key indicator of H1. 
Reasoning in terms of rational choice when talking about terrorism, particularly when trying to 
describe suicide attacks, we have to bear in mind that costly behaviour does not necessarily 
mean crazy behaviour.284  
In citing several recent studies and publications, Berrebi delivers evidence for the normal 
mental status of terrorists.  
Crenshaw for example concludes, that: 
“What limited data we have on individual terrorists… suggests that the 
outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality” 285 
The same conclusion is found in Merari286, as well as in Hudson and Majeska287, who 
suggest that terrorists and suicide attackers were unlikely to be psychologically abnormal 
and therefore reason that the-terrorist-as-mentally-ill approach appears to be contradicted. 
Additional proof for this assumption is found in Atrans study of suicide terrorism, who states 
that: 
“Overall, suicide terrorists exhibit no socially dysfunctional attributes 
(fatherless, friendless, jobless) or suicidal symptoms. Inconsistent with 
economic theories of criminal behaviour, they do not kill themselves simply out 
of hopelessness or a sense of having nothing to lose.” 288  
Berrebi further cites Marc Sageman289, who found a near-total lack of mental disorders in his 
sample of Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists. These conclusions are actually not too surprising, as 
we already heard before that clandestine organisations tend to weed out any aspirants with 
potential mentally disorders for security reasons. It simply would not make sense for a more 
or less professional acting terror organisation to recruit unstable candidates who might attract 
the attention of security forces and thus endanger the entire organisation.  
“In summary, individual terrorists do not fit the profile of poor, ignorant, or 
religious individuals with low opportunity cost and no valued marketable skills; 
nor are they mentally unstable.“ 290   
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The previously described root causes of terror may well be of interest, but they work in 
complicated and sometimes nonintuitive ways.  
Because of the cited arguments, it is quite reasonable to turn to a rational choice approach 
when trying to explain an individual‟s motivation for participating in terrorism. A rational cost-
benefit calculus could under certain circumstances well lead to the conclusion that violence is 
the best available course.291  
Rational choice could be seen as the predominant paradigm of microeconomics and 
nowadays political science. Its core concept to describe the homo economicus, rationality, 
could be distinguished in three levels: in the weakest sense, all actions are rational as long 
as the individual is using them to achieve predetermined ends.292 A stronger definition of 
rationality requires that individuals choose the best action to achieve a desired goal 
according to stable utility functions.293 The strongest definition of rationality requires that 
individuals respond to incentive and behave according to rational expectations.294 
In all of these cases, chosen behaviour may turn out as ineffective or misleading due to 
erroneous information or perceptions, lack of information, or unpredictable complexity in the 
external world.295 This bounded rationality296 leads to the compulsion to choose solutions, 
which seem to be good enough, based on the available information. 
The following passages will be dedicated to show, that terrorists, even suicide terrorists, 
satisfy the stronger demands of rationality inside their specific lifeworld and social contexts.  
What first and foremost suggests the presence of rationality within terrorists groups and that 
terrorist are rational actors is the very fundamental fact that psychopaths or mentally ill 
individuals are simply too unreliable and incapable of being controlled to be of use to terrorist 
groups.297 Moreover, they can´t easily converge to the target without attracting attention, nor 
can they merge back into the crowd after executing an operation.298  
To describe terrorists‟ behaviour in terms of rationality, we have to include satisfaction from 
altruistic behaviour, intangible psychological and social rewards and expected rewards in the 
afterlife in a flexible form of utility function.299  
As rational actors, they would commit terrorist actions in order to maximise their perceived 
utility, even if this means that the perpetrator will receive the promised rewards not until after 
his death. The calculus of terrorists includes their marginal benefits and costs.300 
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“The main argument favouring a rational-choice model is that, if terrorists and 
terror organizations behave rationally, knowledge of their beliefs and 
preferences should help us understand and predict their behaviour. However, 
if they are irrational, their behaviour cannot be explained through rational-
choice models, and no systematic trends based on these models should be 
observed or sought. ”301 
In searching for indicators of rational behaviour, Berrebi decides to distinguish between 
tactical, operational and strategic levels.302  
On the tactical and operational level, there could be found several indicators for the rational 
behaviour. of terrorist groups. 
First, Berrebi proved that targets of terrorist attacks are reasonable chosen for a combination 
of target attractiveness, feasibility, effectiveness, and cost.303 In the Israel-Palestine conflict 
for example, four factors stand out as key determinants of a possible attack: proximity of 
terrorist home bases, proximity of international borders, the presence of Jewish population 
and the presence of a centre of government administration.304 While the first two improved 
access for terrorists and lowered the cost of an attack, the latter two probably raised the 
expected benefit of attacks in the eye of the terrorist group.  
Just as the targets of terrorist attacks, the attack timing as well seems to follow reasonable 
thoughts. Especially the analysis of waiting time between attacks experienced by localities is 
consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the benefit value seen by the terrorist.305  
Further are the chosen attack tactics quite reasonable. Especially suicide attacks are 
primarily used against “hard targets”, which are well protected and therefore the probability of 
apprehension of a conventional attack is high. This significantly reduces the expected 
success of a conventional attack. This indicates a clear calculus in the terrorist‟s choice of 
attack tactics and targets.306 
In addition, there seems to be a clear recognition of human capital considerations in suicide 
bombings. There is a clear correlation between the age and education level of suicide 
bombers and the outcomes of suicide attacks. Both education and age indicate ability and 
experience and seem to positively influence the success of suicide attacks.  
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“In fact, there is very real danger in sending out poorly trained or intellectually 
instable suicide operatives. Dud bombers - those that fail in their attempt to 
detonate their explosives - get caught and can crack under interrogation, 
causing irreparable damage to their group, cell, or operator.” 307 
A rational choice approach would suggest that older, more experienced and well-educated 
individuals will be assigned to attack larger, more-lucrative and more-important targets. A 
similar argument is found in Berman (2003), who points out that those selected for missions 
are likely to be those most committed, but also the most capable of handling the complexities 
and difficulties that might arise and therefore they tend to have higher education and 
technical skills than most other members of terrorist organisations.308 In fact, this assumption 
seems to hold true according to the results of Berrebis study.309 
All these cases strongly suggest that terrorist organisations acts are based on rational 
considerations on the tactical and operational level. This is an important finding, as one of 
the main arguments in this paper rests on the assumption that contrary to popular belief, 
terrorists are not at all irrational or even mentally disordered actors. To this point, this 
argument seems to hold true. Nevertheless shall we proceed with an inspection of terrorists‟ 
rationality on the strategic level.  
On the long term, strategic level, rationality could be, among others, observed when looking 
at economic warfare. One of Al Qaedas‟ formulated goals is to force the US into bankruptcy 
with its attacks. Considering that the estimated costs of the 9/11 attacks, which were about 
500.000$, stand against several billions US Dollar, which were spend in the war against 
terror campaign and the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this strategy seems to be 
extremely successful.310  
If we take it for granted that one ultimate goal of terrorist campaigns is to maximise economic 
hardship on their enemies, Berrebi argues that we should be able to observe a serious, if not 
destabilising impact of terror attacks on the targeted economies, or at least a 
disproportionally higher cost of terror attacks and counter terrorist actions, than that incurred 
by the terrorist organisation which planned and executed the attacks. Indeed, there seems to 
be a significant correlation between the losses of directly or indirectly attacked companies 
and economies on the stock markets and respective terrorist attacks.311 In general, the 
literature agrees that flows of international trade may be negatively affected by terrorism 
events.312  
Moreover, waging a war is much more expensive than financing a terrorist campaign. On top, 
the special character of terrorist campaigns, which is the spread of fear, intimidation and the 
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radiation of the feeling of being vulnerable among the population, is mirrored in the economic 
effects of terrorist attacks. The majority of the economic impact of terror can be attributed to 
the psychological reactions in the aftermath of the attacks, rather than to the actual damages 
themselves.313  
Out of the view of terrorists, the use of terrorism therefore seems to be a rational decision 
regarding the significant effect on the attacked economies at comparable low costs.  
Terrorist organisations could as well pursuit territorial and liberation goals. Territorial aims 
usually seek to liberate significant religious or historical regions from the occupation of a 
foreign entity. This motivation can be, among others, observed when identifying the goals of 
Hamas, the Al Aqsa Brigade, Hezbollah or of the PKK314, which all seek to liberate a 
distinctive territory from a foreign power. There are several evidences, which indicate that 
terrorism as a strategy to force the withdrawal of a perceived enemy from a region works: 
“…, over the past two decades, suicide terrorism has been rising largely 
because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorists sought to 
compel American and French military forces to abandon Lebanon in 1983, 
Israeli forces to leave Lebanon in 1985, Israeli forces to quit the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995, the Sri Lankan government to create an 
independent Tamil state from 1990 on, and the Turkish government to grant 
autonomy to the Kurds in the late 1990s. In all but the case of Turkey, the 
terrorist political cause made more gains after the resort to suicide operations 
than it had before.” 315  
Because of these examples, it is well legitimate to ascribe terrorists rational behaviour, even 
on the strategic level. This return of rationality in terrorists‟ behaviour and actions enables 
new pathways in understanding terrorists, and to find alternative ways to describe this 
ambivalent actor. One of these possibilities will be introduced on the following pages.  
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TERRORISTS AS POLITICAL ACTIVISTS 
A rational choice approach would therefore define terrorism as an extreme and violent form 
of political activism, as the systematic use of violence to create a general climate of fear in a 
population and thereby to bring about a particular political objective.316 This interpretation 
emphasises that terrorism is a form of political communication.317 Notably, a form of political 
communication, which, at least in the case of Al Qaeda, doesn´t seem to work.318  
Nevertheless, seeing terrorism as an extreme form of political activism would explain, why 
terrorists tend to be higher educated and generally wealthier319 than the overall population 
from which they advent, as this is a general characteristic of political activists.320  
Moreover, political activism is as likely to be based on religious motivation as it is to be 
rooted in secular ideologies.321 This argument is based on the assumption that values and 
beliefs cause terrorism, which could be either secular or religious, or even both.322 
Furthermore are political activists barely to be considered mentally ill. All these arguments 
hold true for the evidence on the micro-level, as well as on the organisational level discussed 
so far.  
On top, a strong indicator for the occurrence of terrorist organisations in a society is the 
amount of political freedom and civil liberties. Several studies323 suggest that origin countries 
of terrorism tend to have low levels of civil liberties. Moreover, increased state repression 
and the structure of party politics are assumed to be significant predictors of terrorism. This 
evidence strongly suggest the terrorist-as-a-political-activist argument, as especially 
wealthier and better-educated individuals tend to fight a repressive regime.  
“Repression of peaceful means of political dissent may force opposition 
movements into the underground and encourage their resort to violence, 
because they lack alternatives and face persecution from the state. 
Repressions fuels perceptions of injustice.” 324 
Another evidence for the political activist approach could be choice of attacked targets. The 
RAND Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism database shows that more than a 
quarter of all documented terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2007 were against government 
or diplomatic targets.  
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“In fact, political targets were attacked more often than any other target 
category, more than religious figures and institutions, educational institutions, 
journalists and media, telecommunication, food or water supplies, utilities, 
transportation, tourists, airports, airlines and aviation, nongovernmental 
organisations, maritime or military, abortion-related, or even other terrorists 
and former terrorist targets all combined. Notably, half of the assassinations 
perpetrated by terrorists and about 60 percent of the terrorist hostage and 
barricade attacks were against governmental and diplomatic targets.” 325 
Overall, it is quite reasonable to argue that terrorists act according to an intrinsic rationality. 
Terrorists and terrorist groups should be assumed to be rational, at least in the sense of 
taking actions they believe are consistent with their goals. In some cases in the sense of 
being smart in the choice of their tactics, in other cases in the even stronger sense of being 
consistent with a credible assessment of prospects.326 On top, regarding the given evidence, 
it is as well reasonable to understand terrorists as political activists, who seek to accomplish 
their goals with the means of violence. 
This has strong implications on the way, we understand terrorists, which attributes we assign 
them, and how authorities and security forces will have to deal with this global acting 
network.  
“The first requirement is to recognise that terrorism is a political problem, to be 
solved through political means.” 327  
Those targeted should remember that terrorists‟ intend is to provoke overreaction, support, 
and compel the abandonment of commitments. Only a response that respects democratic 
values and rewards peaceful means of expressing opinion can make terrorism illegitimate.328 
The previously drawn picture of the terrorist still could be assumed to be quite accurate on 
the motivational and contextual level, but definitely has to be complemented with the attribute 
of rationality, which finally promotes the terrorist to a political activist.  
This is not a completely new approach, as the political aims of terrorism were undisputed 
throughout history. Important is the appreciation, that terrorism as a tactic, and as a strategy 
is a conscious and deliberately rational act of the respective perpetrator. Denying this 
rationality by labelling terrorists as mentally ill, religious deluded fanatics, unforgivably 
narrows the view and the possibilities of deeper understanding.  
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A SNAPSHOT OF THE TERRORIST 
After the introduction of a rational choice approach, motivational factors and root causes, 
which promote the radicalisation process of terrorists and positively influence their 
commitment to terror attacks, the following image of the terrorists‟ self-image, social 
embeddedness and societal contexts emerges of the cited scientific contributions: 
Perpetrators of Islamist terrorism perceive themselves as future-orientated fighters for a just 
cause, which can be either political, religious or tied to a concrete inducement and appear to 
be deeply convinced of the values and norms of their respective ideology (secular or 
religious).  
As they are usually not pursuing purely egocentric goals, they could well be regarded as 
altruistic actors, who face the globalisation force of Western culture and values. Moreover, 
Terrorists tend to be wealthier and better educated than the average society, highly adapt in 
using modern technology and communication channels. Thus, their actions are deliberate, 
and indeed rational on the tactical as well as on the strategic level, following steady 
assumptions of their costs and benefits. These features strongly suggest labelling 
perpetrators of terrorism as political activists, who use the means of violence to maintain 
publicity, to pursue distinct goals and to provoke overreaction, attract support, and compel 
the abandonment of commitments.  
They further usually are members of social groups, which promote the individuals‟ 
radicalisation process. Group members are interacting whether in face-to-face encounters or 
in cyberspace, which promote in-group/out-group biases, conformity, compliance, groupthink 
and polarisations among its affiliates. Social groups further spread responsibilities for actions 
among their members and especially to group- or higher authorities. The decision to conduct 
terrorist attacks is based on the conviction that action will positively influence and advance 
the respective group goals and -interests and will produce positive reactions among the 
group members and their respective community.  
Deeper motivational factors for committing terror attacks are found in the perpetrators‟ desire 
for political or religious change, in personally or collective perceived discriminations, 
injustices, grievances or in the duty to defend members of a cultural community, to which the 
perpetrator is bound through strong, though mainly fictive kinship ties.  
Especially for the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants, raised in Western 
societies, but as well for Muslims in Islamic countries, who perceive an omnipresent force of 
Western values, the alienation from the discriminating Western system, or even from this life 
and the identification with a traditional Islamic culture together with an idealisation of the 
hereafter promotes their radicalisation process and their willingness to die for their cause.  
A crucial role in the cultural context play furthermore cultural and social obligations as well as 
the normative acceptability of violence.  
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In addition, perceived social, religious and financial rewards for themselves and their 
families, together with and divinely inspired imperative of struggle lead them to engage in 
terror activities.  
Besides individual- and group motivational factors, which lead individuals to undergo a 
process of radicalisation and eventually come to be perpetrators of terrorism, root causes try 
to identify broader societal processes, which could lead to terrorism.  
Some of these root causes, like perceived illegitimacy of the regime, perceived repression, or 
injustices, and humiliation, as well as grievances, alienation, the acceptance of violence and 
human insecurity or global systemic explanations partly overlap with the already mentioned 
motivational factors.  
Others, like poverty or other economic factors, educational level, modernisation, democracy, 
just as ideology, religion and culture could serve as auxiliary preconditions for the emerge of 
terror, though not always in the intuitive manner.  
In order to maintain support for their terror campaigns in the form of manpower,  funding, 
material, sanctuaries, intelligence, and tolerance of activities, terror groups use the means of 
intimidation, propaganda efforts, the provision of social services, and promote identification 
with the group among the respective community and, if possible, even penetrate weak state 
institutions.  
In order to contrast this quite elaborated picture of the terrorist, which emerges out of the 
cited scientific contributions, with a postmodern perception, we shall now turn to the concept 
of postmodernity, which is, at least on the behalf of the author, supposed to be the most 
significant global systemic determinant of Islamist terrorism. 
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POSTMODERNISM 
After examining terrorism on the tactical and strategic level, and in addition delivering first 
indicators underlining the importance of global processes, as well as an discussion of 
motivations, root causes and social processes on the individual-, group- and social level, 
which influence individuals in their decision to become perpetrators of violent acts, we shall 
now have a closer look at the constantly reoccurring global structures, which promote, or 
probably even compel terrorism.  
Thus one concept of global societal change, which shall be applied in order to describe the 
Islamist terrorist accurately, is postmodernism. The idea to use postmodern concepts to 
understand international terrorism, or even the terrorist himself, is based on several 
characteristics of Islamist terrorism. Lawrence Freedman suggested in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks that the postmodern war had finally begun. He stated that these attacks do not 
have physical consequences, but human, and are directed against symbols, which illustrate 
US superiority.329 This targeting of symbols and identity denotes the beginning of a 
postmodern conflict.  
At least since the 1980‟s, the term postmodernism is omnipresent in the universities as well 
as in our everyday life. Despite its frequent use, postmodernism still lacks of a precise 
definition. The only certainty is that postmodernism is highly related to modernism. In which 
way, shall be explored on the following pages.  
The complexity of defining postmodernism lies in the indecisive character of the postmodern 
era itself. It is not only about the question, whether postmodernism supersedes or continues 
modernism, but if time, history and modern thinking can even be uphold.330 Postmodernism 
in this meaning could describe the disembowelment of modernity‟s meaning.331 Modernity is 
characterised through the Enlightenment, logic, rationality and the generally applicable 
dichotomy of Good and Evil. That doubtless included self-criticism, but only within its intrinsic 
logic.332 Postmodernist argumentation questions this intrinsic logic, deconstructs it and 
confronts it with alternative narratives of its own history.  
What all the different theories on postmodernism have in common is their critical relation to 
modernity. Basically, postmodernism is about the intransigent pluralisation of the modern 
culture and society.333 Along with this emerges a radical breach within the history of 
modernity, which forces us to rethink, rephrase, or even abandon all of its previous motives, 
patterns, and stipulations.334  
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While the imperative of modernity was strongly tied to the battle cry of the French Revolution, 
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, postmodernism declared armistice with its main 
characteristics; Freedom, Diversity, and Tolerance. Bauman adds, if Tolerance could be 
converted in Solidarity, the ceasefire could even transform to peace. 335  
 
THE GENEALOGY OF POSTMODERNISM 
The word postmodernism first appears around the 1900‟s, referring to “postmodern” 
paintings. Rudolf Pannwitz336 uses the term 1917 referring to Friedrich Nietzsche‟s critic on 
European culture. Postmodernism finally reached a broad prominence in the wider public 
through the developments of the Pop Art, which unsettled the conventions of the fine Arts, 
and a remarkable article by Leslie Fiedler, published 1969 in the Playboy, who stressed that 
the elitist demands of the dominant high culture should be overthrown. Instead, he suggested 
a constructive contact with the popular mass culture and consumption.337 This article was the 
summit of a wide debate in American literature science, which postulated the flatten of 
innovative potency after a period of consolidation in the modern high culture.338 The blending 
of high culture works with mass culture writings, which was until then unbelievable, 
precipitated realignment of literature science‟s evaluation process. This break away of the 
clear distinction between higher arts for the educated and the more prosperous and the “sub 
art” for the masses closed the gap between the artist and its audience. Postmodernism in the 
arts enabled an unknown liberty in expression for the artist that allowed him to facilitate 
between the reality and the mystic and imaginative world of the spirit.339 The artist combined 
these two contradictory dimension not through adaption, or levelling of the two extremes, but 
through polyglotism, pluralism and the construction of at least a double-structure, if not a 
multi-structure.340  
Thereby, the American literature debate delivered not only a strong identification tool for 
postmodernism in literature science, but for all other scientific disciplines. Finally, the genuine 
cultural postmodern thinking even reached philosophy, which turned against the elite, violent 
and marginalising meta-narratives of modernity, thereby pluralising the monolithic and 
idealised concepts of reason, truth, history, aesthetics and beauty.341 Thus, postmodernism 
emerged not out of an antimodern impulse, but because of the ambiguous dynamic of 
modernity itself and was further accelerated through modern technologies.   
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POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY 
Postmodernism means the fundamental practise of pluralism of languages, patterns, and 
procedures, not only side by side, but interreferential.342  
Applied on our society would this mean a pluralism of values and norms, and the coexistence 
of different spheres with differing, often contradictory values and norms. Indeed are there 
significant gaps between the benchmarks of culture and economy for example. While the 
former postulates the value of individual fulfilment and indulgence, the later is orientated on 
values like rationality and efficiency.343 Politics could be an additional sphere, which is 
highlighting equality among the members of a society.  
This heterogeneity not only promotes the plurality of values, beliefs, languages, reality or 
action patterns, it rather clamours it.344 Moreover, this heterogeneity in the postmodern era 
not only manifests in the mentioned spheres, but penetrates right into the subject. The 
individual has to follow conflicting values and interests, not only when leaving one sphere 
and entering another, but at the same moment, as the different spheres are overlapping. 
Within this set of contradicting values and norms, between which conflicts are bound to occur 
and reconciliation seems to be impossible, the individual has to develop an integrated 
personality and character. Thus, postmodern society is indissoluble plural. Who would try to 
ignore this pluralism as a sociologist would be ignorant; and as a politician would be a 
tyrant.345   
Postmodernism is consequently characterised through plurality, multidimensionality, 
discrepancy and heterogeneity. The overall concept, the shared sense and context of all in 
everything, which dominated modernity is disintegrated in postmodernity. Nevertheless, this 
is not meant as a license for confusion, but as an uncompromisingly practiced offer for 
internal and external differentiation.  
Hence, postmodernism could be described through the following features, summarised by 
Ihab Hassan: 
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 “Vagueness: herein fall all types of ambiguities, breaches and shifts within 
the knowledge of our society 
 Fragmentation: as the reason for vagueness. Fragmentation results from 
the condemnation of any totalisation 
 Dissolution of the canon: delegitimation of social norms, a subversion, 
which finds its most shocking dimension in terrorism, its most positive 
dimension in the mobilisation of minorities.  
 Loss of Identity and depth: the identity disperses in a surface of stylistic 
gestures that refuse any interpretation  
 not-portrayable: postmodernist art is irreal and not-iconic 
 Irony (or perspectivism): play, interplay, dialog, polylog, allegory, self-
reflection, and reflexivity as expression of the permanent creation process 
of human spirit 
 Hybridisation: as genre mutations, de-definition and deformation of cultural 
genres 
 Carnivalisation: as the anti-system, a cheerful relativity of reality 
 Performance and participation: indecisiveness as practice 
 Construct character: postmodernism works radically through tropes, 
figurative speech and irrealisms. 
 Immanence: everything is transformed into signs of its own language. The 
immanence of the semiotic system leads to an intertextuality of life.” 346   
 
Postmodernity radically questions the premises of modernity, A reflexive postmodernity, 
which not merely despises modernity and celebrates its catastrophe could be understood as 
a radical self-criticism of modernity. It does not discards the Enlightenment, rationality, truth 
and other elements of the modernity, but it rather tries to realise, maybe even materialise, the 
respective excluded, the Other and the suppressed of these fundamental concepts.347  
Thus, postmodern theories refer to the most different approaches without following any 
tradition of thought or chronology. Postmodern theory rather question the possibility of 
systematic theory, criticise the claim of truth of modernity and discard the hegemony of 
reason in favour of a variety of rationalities, including the irrational.348  
The postmodern formula “anything goes”349 targets the universal validity claim of modernity. 
Not only privileges modernity reason, the reasonable subject, definiteness and 
meaningfulness, truth, beauteousness and logic, modernity violently excludes their 
respective Others in their name. Irrationality, the craziness, the meaningless, silentness, the 
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unattractive and the illogicality are granted no space in modernity, they get banned, denied, 
disowned, disciplined, controlled and deported.350  
The dynamic of this contrastive pairs was explored by Horckheimer and Adorno in Dialectic 
of Enlightenment351 and although modernity seeks to abandon the negative connoted 
counterparts of itself, they seem to be the engine of its social development.  
Postmodern philosophy picks up this argumentation and is thus characterised through the 
following three concepts: 
 
 First, postmodern philosophy seeks a pluralisation of the singular key 
concepts of modernity. Instead of one truth, one reason or on aesthetic, 
postmodernity pleads for numerous truths, numerous reasons and 
numerous aesthetics.  
 Second, postmodern philosophy postulates the liquidation of the modern 
certainty that there exists after all deconstruction, a material world. Reality 
in postmodernity is instead a pure medial simulation and a virtual reality.  
 Third, postmodernism emphasises the end of the great narratives like 
communism, democracy, or capitalism.  
 
Nietzsche was the most consequent forward thinker of postmodern philosophy, who radically 
broke up with the modern rationality. According to him, it is not reasonable thought that 
determines the individual and its actions, but his volition to power. Descartès‟ reasoning I 
think, therefore I am, is replaced by Nietzsche through I want, therefore I am.352   
Another important pioneer in postmodern thinking was the linguist Ferdinand Saussure, who 
postulated that there is no natural relationship between the shape of a word (the signifier) 
and its actual meaning (the significate), thereby revealing the constructive character of 
language. Thus, language is not a medium to describe a universal reality, but a result of 
human conventions. Consequently, reality, which becomes describable through language, is 
itself a social convention, a social construct.353  
The breach of language, thought and the individual, as well as the collective perception with 
the not existing subsistent reality disembogues in the infinity of possible interpretations of 
reality. Postmodern relativism of text and context and the denial of a subsistent reality 
constitute the exact opposite of modern thinking, whose ultimate target is the stabilisation of 
sense. Instead, the generally applicable meaning is liquidated354 by the notion, that all human 
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values, including the basal distinction between Good and Evil, are nothing more than 
categorical projections of humankind.355  
This radical cultural and ethical relativism is regarded as the end of the totalitarianisms, 
which seemed to lead more or less inevitably to justifying the use of force against different 
beliefs. Even without violence, the claim for one valid truth - once and for all - kills the 
dialogue with others and favours inhumanity in all dealings between human beings.356 
Nevertheless, instead of totalitarianism emerges the dictatorship of relativism, which could 
point the way to the ultimate catastrophe of humankind, for it compels us to abandon the 
clear distinctions of modernity, between Good and Evil, between us and other people and 
finally leave human beings on their own and without guidance when facing the dangers of 
civilisation.357 This demand will be further discussed in the following chapter.  
More important at this point is the composition of reality in postmodernity. As we mentioned 
before, reality is no longer regarded as a natural certainty, but as a social construction.   
Hence, the surfaces of our constructed realities are not only huge playgrounds for arbitrary 
interpretations, but are as well expression of the sacrifice of emotions, experiences and 
memories, as the material evaporates in the immateriality of information.358  
The denial of any materiality, any underlying reality consequently suggests the notion that we 
actually live in a simulated world of symbols and, in a strict sense, we ourselves are only 
simulations as well. As symbols, as we heard before, finally lost their relationship to an outer 
reality, and we further replaced knowledge and experience through symbols and pictures, 
distributed in the media, our perceived reality became its own representation. Instead of 
anything real, nowadays there only exist copies of copies of representations of 
representations, without an identifiable original, which could proof the authenticity or truth of 
the copies.359  
What remains are surfaces, on which the copies of reality finally turn out to be truer, realer 
than reality, as they become more authentic than reality could have ever been. Therefore, 
postmodernity generates a hyperreality, characterised through unreferenced bits of 
information, symbols and pictures, which are unbound to time and place.360  
This effect is paradoxically further promoted through modern technologies like television or 
the Internet, which not only deliver individualised footage of reality; the provided pictures 
become reality. Through modern communication media, locality and time become arbitrarily 
exchangeable, therefore they lose their privileged status as an origin or destination.361  
This decentralisation causes the loss of continuity of experience, which is constitutive for the 
substantiality of the recognised. The moment, in which the object and its picture are 
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experienced at the same time, in which they are referred to each other, is replaced by a 
digitalised simulation of it on the screen. This simulation does not refer to the actual object 
anymore, but to a potentiality, to an “it could be”.362 
While modernity was denoted by expansion, by a metaphorical “explosion”, postmodernity 
disembogues in a catastrophic “implosion” The simulated hyperreality collapses in itself.363 
With Baudrillard, the author will argue that this implosion is manifested by today‟s 
international terrorism.  
 
THE POSTMODERN HUMAN BEING 
As the aim of this thesis is to focus on the individual perpetrator of terrorism, it is necessary 
to examine the consequences of postmodernity affecting the modern idea of the subject.  
Basically, postmodern criticism of modernity leads to the death of the subject. Humanism and 
Enlightenment shaped the image of the subject of modernity; it described the human being 
as free, equal, self-confident, and in command of reason and rationality to act self-
determined.  
However, the idea of the human as an autonomous subject remained an unredeemed 
promise.364 On these grounds, postmodernity not only questions humanism and 
Enlightenment, but argues that the human being itself is an invention of modernity. Indeed, it 
was Foucault, who revealed that the modern conception of the human being as a subject 
was a result of social processes in the 17th and 18th century and is not, just as a postmodern 
approach would suggest, based on the immanent nature of the human being.365  
Because of the described vaporisation of modernity‟s certainties and liabilities, the human 
being can no longer be understood as a consistent and coherent individual. It rather appears 
to be flexibilised, schizophrenic, standardised, disciplined, decentralised and at mercy of 
randomness, desires and wishes.366    
The human life in the era of postmodernism is determined by contingency367. The 
contingency of identity, values and lifeworlds, even of reality itself, describes the lack of 
persuasive reasons for them being as they are. Postmodern reality is not only differing 
according to every subjects‟ individual perception, but it could as well be different, if the 
participating individuals would have had acted differently.368  
The living conditions of everyday life could be described as meta-stable, marked of 
breaches, flexibilities and recommencements. It seems as if the postmodern individual is 
constantly forced to re-invent itself because it cannot rely on the disappeared coordinates of 
modernity any longer. There is no central subject, no epicentre of life, no compulsory 
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destination, neither is there a determined origin. Therefore, the postmodern human being 
could well be labelled as a decentralised subject.369  
The aesthetic experience of the subject‟s decentralisation is already described by Nietzsche, 
with his notion of the constantly recurrence of the same. 370 This notion refers to the different 
pieces of the decomposed subject, which must be passed through. The reason for the 
decomposition is found in the postulated death of God, who served as the guarantor for 
identity in modernity. This persistent intern genesis leads from the modern statement of the 
value of worth to the postmodern question of the worth of values, a remarkable shift in the 
discourse that tags the line between the modern and the postmodern. The postmodern 
subject is due to its volition to power capable of overwhelming established values and able to 
create new ones.371 This capability should definitely be understood as a compulsion, as the 
postmodern self-orientation postulates that only if the individual makes something of itself, it 
is something.372  
The wish of second and third generation Muslim immigrants in Western societies for a 
fundamentally possible alternative life,373 could well be framed with this shift. Although Beck 
not explicitly goes that far, one could well argue that due to the Western narrative refusal to 
accept, not to talk about being able to include this wish for an alternative life in its modern 
conception, the West itself promotes the escalating of this struggle, which is finally exploding 
in terrorism, literally spoken.     
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TERRORISM MEETS POSTMODERNISM 
“With the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, we might even be 
said to have before us the absolute event, the Mother of all events, the pure 
event uniting within itself all the events that have never taken place.” 374 
In his postmodern analysis of terrorism, especially focusing on the 9/11 attacks, Baudrillard 
identifies several key factors, which promote, maybe even clamour terrorism.  
First, the (postmodern) allergy to any definitive order, to any definitive power, is universal. 
Consequently, the increase in the power of power heightens the will to destroy it.375 There is 
no doubt that the United States, the hegemon of the West had their unipolar moment at the 
turn of the millennium.376 Thus, the twin towers of the World Trade Center, as the perfect 
embodiments and outstanding symbols of that definitive order, were more than obvious 
targets for subaltern movements.  
Second, the more concentrated a system becomes globally, ultimately forming one single 
network, the more it becomes vulnerable at a single point.377  
Third, when a global power monopolises the situation to an extent, as the Western 
hegemony did, where no alternative form of thinking is allowed, Baudrillard sees no other 
way but a terroristic situational transfer.378 He consequently argues that it was the system 
itself, which created the objective conditions and furthermore delivered the technological 
capabilities for this brutal retaliation.  
Terrorism in this sense, just like viruses, is everywhere. It is terror against terror, the 
subaltern against the hegemon. It is not about politics, nor is there an ideology behind it. The 
global perfusion of terrorism accompanies any system of domination. Therefore, it is not any 
longer possible to draw a demarcation line around it, localise terrorism in certain regions, or 
identify the perpetrators by certain features. 
 “[Terrorism} is at the very heart of the culture which combats it, and the visible 
fracture (and the hatred) that pits the exploited and the underdeveloped 
globally against the Western world secretly connects with the fracture internal 
to the dominant system.” 379 
The system is definitely able to face down any visible antagonist. But against the other kind, 
which, just as postmodernism suggests, is secreted in any machinery of dominance, against 
this form of automatic reversion of its own power, the system can do nothing.  
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“And terrorism is the shock wave of this silent reversion.” 380 
The opponents in this fundamental antagonism are not at all America and the Islam, the 
former is probably the epicentre, but not the sole embodiment of globalisation, while the latter 
is not at all the embodiment of terrorism. The antagonism lies in the fact, that the triumphant 
globalisation is battling itself.381  
The force of globalisation, just as any other hegemonic force, lies in its hermeneutic power to 
demarcate the ordinary from the abnormal, the order from the chaos, health from sickness 
and rationality from insanity. Sovereignty is anxious to describe the other sides of these 
relations as dangerous opponents. However, it is the force of hegemony itself, which 
produces these opponents by depriving of them what the hegemony force is claiming for 
itself. Through the creation of an enemy image, the force of Western hegemony tries to purify 
itself from ambivalences inherent in the global order, inherent in itself.382  
Baudrillard labels this the Fourth World War. This war  
“…haunts every world order, all hegemonic domination - if Islam dominated 
the world, terrorism would rise against Islam, for it is the world, the globe itself, 
which resists globalisation.” 383 
This dynamic reveals a structural misunderstanding on the rationality of modernity about the 
relation of Good and Evil. In modern connotation, terrorism is the Evil, the Other, which has 
to be fought and conquered by the Good, the moral and the just represented by the West. 
This identification of the Good as the followers of God and the conquerors of the Evil leads to 
the fusion of the distinction between us and others and the distinction of Good and Evil. The 
Evil is constructed as the absence of God. Labelling certain people or groups as Evil 
changes them into monsters and disputes their humanity.384 
The naive thought that the advance of the Good corresponds to a defeat of Evil neglects the 
fact that Good and Evil advance together as a part of the same movement.385  
“Good does not conquer Evil, nor indeed does the reverse happen: they are at 
once both irreducible to each other and inextricably interrelated.“ 386 
During the Cold War, there was a balance in the narrative of Good and Evil. The dialectical 
relation of these two antagonists was maintained in an equilibrium of power. After the 
supremacy of one over the other, after the extrapolation of the Good over any form of 
                                               
380
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 11) 
381
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 11) 
382
 (Bauman, 1992, S. 277) 
383
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 12) 
384
 (Beck U. , 2010, p. 55) 
385
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 13) 
386
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 13) 
“THE TERRORIST IN A POSTMODERN PERCEPTION”  MICHAEL JOSEF RAAB, BAKK. PHIL 
PAGE | 84  
negativity, this equilibrium was gone and the Evil transformed into an invisible autonomy and 
henceforward developing exponentially.387  
Radical Islam was merely the moving front along which the antagonism crystallised. The 
significant difference of the manifestation of the inherent Evil is the form of resistance, of the 
exposure of power, which is no longer manifested by traditional armed forces that limited the 
expansion of influence to definable geographical borders, but is manifested in asymmetric 
terror. It is exactly this asymmetry of international terrorism, which leaves the global 
omnipotence entirely disarmed.388  
At odds with itself, the hegemonic Western system can only plunge further into its own logic 
of relations of force, but cannot operate on the terrorists‟ terrain of the symbolic challenge 
and death.389 While the West operates on the modern level of reality, rationality and the 
dichotomy of Good and Evil, international terrorists switched into postmodernity, targeting not 
buildings, concrete persons or institutions, but the ideas, the values and the symbolic 
patterns manifested by them.  
Furthermore, international terrorists are turning their own deaths into an absolute counter 
strike weapon against a system that operates on the basis of the exclusion of death. 
Therefore, all the Western meanings of deterrence and detention turn out to be ineffective 
against an enemy, who already putted his life on stake.  
“Our men are as eager to die as the Americans are to live!” 390 
The significance of the suicide bombers‟ willingness to die lies not in his death itself, in the 
ending of his life on the level of reality, but in the symbolic and sacrificial performance of his 
death.391 Well knowing, that fighting on the ground of reality, the sphere where the system is 
in advantage, would be desperate, the terrorist shifts the struggle into the symbolic sphere, 
where the rule is that of challenge, reversion and outbidding. Baudrillard suggest that on this 
level, death can only be met by equal or greater death, which ultimately leads to the collapse 
and death of the system itself.392  
We already heard of the central role of pictures and images in a postmodern perception. This 
is especially important for terror attacks. Among the hegemonic systems‟ inherent weapons 
and technologies (stock markets, electronic information, or air traffic) which have been 
exploited and turned against it by international terrorists, the most important are the media, 
as terrorists exploited the real time of images.  
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The image, as we heard before, consumes the event, absorbs it and offers it to the audience 
for consumption.393 It was the worldwide broadcast of the terrible attack on 9/11, which made 
it to an event. The fascination with the attack is primarily a fascination with its images, the 
reality of this attacks superadded a bonus of terror, an additional frisson.394  
“The spectacle of terrorism forces the terrorism of spectacle upon us.” 395 
The radicality and brutality of the spectacle is original and irreducible. Moreover, it can´t be 
interpreted as historical violence, as the attacks had no rational meaning, which would 
suggest a moral axiom of good violence. Terrorism uses symbolic violence, and the media 
broadcast the symbolic events around the world. Thus, they become part of the terror, which 
would be nothing but single incidents lacking any symbolic power without the media.396  
Terrorisms‟ true victory lies in the uncontrollable unleashing of reversibility in the 
demonstration of the hegemonic systems‟ weakness and incompetence to respond to 
actions, which are situated outside its intrinsic logic, its‟ enlightened rationality.397 This victory 
not only gets visible in its immediate economic, political, or financial consequences and the 
resulting moral and psychological downturn, but which is crucial, in the slump of the Western 
value system. The ideas of freedom, free circulation, in short, the Western civil rights, with 
which the West prided itself and which were to be promoted around the world by a liberal 
globalisation, are already fading from minds and a police-state globalisation assumes its 
place. Thus, the West, in trying to oppose the new threat, undergoes a strategic fallback, a 
painful revision of its values.398  
“Terrorism ultimately has no meaning, no objective, and cannot be measured 
by its real political and historical consequences. And it is, paradoxically, 
because it has no meaning that it constitutes an event in a world increasingly 
saturated with meaning and efficacy.” 399 
Thus, terrorism, beyond its spectacular violence, is the radical antagonism at the very heart 
of globalisation, a force irreducible to the technical and mental realisation of the world, a vital 
counterforce grappling with the death force of the system.400  
Terrorism simply carries things to the extreme, to the point of paroxysm. It translates the 
virtual character of the world, which has been discussed in the previous chapter, into total 
insecurity and thus deconstructs the extreme form of efficiency and hegemony at its weakest 
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point, which is the incapability to bear the spectre of opposition, to comprise the Other within 
itself, especially as the Other acts against the very principles of the hegemonic power.401  
Terrorism is in this perception the subaltern answer to the hegemonic claim of the West. A 
claim, promoted by globalisation, but simultaneously eroded by it. Incidentally, this claim 
reveals the irrevocable fact that globalisation is more than an economic process. It produces 
new kinds of de-nationalised subjects and life situations, new categories of rich and poor, at 
the top and the bottom of society, all of which undermine the premises of Western 
attitudes.402  
Nevertheless, the globalisation of the Western values, basically those of the civil rights, could 
not keep abreast with the globalisation of economy, finance and information. Transnational 
companies, capitalism as such intruded into the remotest corners of the world and diversified 
the value chain into regions, which are far away from granting civil liberties due to the 
premise of profit maximisation. The respond to this cleavage was the discard of civil liberties. 
Consequently, the globalisation of trade puts an end to the universality of values.403  
In the final analysis, we observe societies intruded by the Western lifestyle, but not in their 
institutions, their rights or value systems, but in their shops, there TV shows and their 
commercials; and while these societies could buy Western cars, clothes or technological 
devices, they are still politically suppressed or caught up between traditional value systems 
and the challenges of modernisation. It is exactly this area of tension, where some decide to 
battle the hegemonic force, which promised them everything but gave them nothing but 
unfulfilled desires.  
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(H1) THE ILLEGITIMATE ACTOR 
“Contrary to popular belief and media depiction, most terrorism is neither 
crazed nor capricious. Rather, terrorist attacks are generally both 
premeditated and carefully planned.” 404   
The popular narrative about terrorists, which was particularly constructed in the aftermath of 
9/11 was characterised through stereotypes and simplifications. In this discourse, all those 
labelled as terrorists share a terrorist code of ethics, work toward a transcendent terrorist 
objective based on one Arab mind and the nature of Islam. The result was an image of a 
monolithic and evil Enemy Other that negates the “Western” culture and its values.405 More 
or less scientific efforts drew the picture of a mentally disordered individual, suffering from 
borderline, brought on by Islamic child rearing practices.406  
Thereby, suicide bombers were presented as terminal cases of a general Muslim malady. 
The image of the crazy terrorist not precisely describes an individual, but degrades an entire 
society.407 
The ascribed attributes of the West were idealised and summarised under Enlightenment, 
rationalism, individualism, democracy, and tolerance, while the non-West was labelled as 
emotional, communitarian, despotic, violent, and traditionalist.408 
For the educated reader, it is obvious that simplifications and stereotypes like that could 
scarcely prove to be true in reality, as they blind out the socio-political diversity in societies 
and historically grown social processes, values and norms.  
Nevertheless, this image strongly influenced the popular image of the “non-West” world, 
degrading it to an uncivilised region, inhabited by natives insensitive to ethics. This native, 
the manifestation of the cumulated ascriptions of “the Arab” and “the Muslim” represents not 
only the absence of values, but also the negation of values. He is constructed as the enemy 
of values, and in this sense as the absolute Evil, which has to be fought with all means.409   
The intrinsic logic in this argumentation reads as follows: an enemy of human values (which 
are profoundly Western values) could himself not be human. The terrorist, or rather an entire 
society (which is not even a single society, but a heterogenic conglomerate of nationalities, 
ethnics, religious communities and even states) becomes dehumanised and disempowered.  
“To talk of Evil is to question the humanity of others.” 410 
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This process of De-Humanisation opens the door for counterterrorism measures like targeted 
killings, of which we will hear later in this chapter, deportations, detentions without 
accusations and much more.  
Osama bin Laden and his followers delivered the empirical bases for this argumentation, as 
they dwelled in caves, sported turbans, kept their beards long and appeared to shun the 
modern world when citing the Qur‟an. This rejection of the West delivered a fertile ground for 
the narrative of a new white-man‟s burden: pacifying Middle Eastern terrorism; bringing 
secularism, democracy, and free market economies to the natives, and on top of that, 
making the region safe for the Eastern outpost of Western values, Israel.411  
The often-cited clash of civilisations412 is the result of this narrative, which labels the Islamic 
world as antimodern and understands religious movements as the manifestation of the deep 
rejection of the West‟s paradigm of human- and civil rights.413 The notion that Islamist 
terrorism is part of a clash of civilisations rests on the idea that… 
“… culturally conditioned differences between our and their fundamental 
values - secular versus sacred, modern versus primitive. This dichotomy in 
turn draws on the notion that modernity is universal in application but 
necessarily Western in form and content: to be modern, one has to act, think, 
and consume like a Western (or, rather, like the idealized self-image of the 
civilization theorist).”  414 
In fact, the West is confronted with the shock of discovering, that its model of modernity is 
not universal. But it is not just the differences between the religions that have such huge 
potential for conflicts, but the implosion of contextually shaped universalisms and social and 
moral certainties.415  
“However, there is evidence that cultural differences do not extend to political 
values, and that Islam and democracy are, in fact, compatible.” 416 
One important, yet relatively under-examined feature of counterterrorism means are targeted 
killings. This method have become a tactic of preeminent choice for combating violent, non-
state organisations and it is used by the US against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Pakistan, by Turkey against the PKK in northern Iraq and of course, among others by Israel 
against Hamas, Hezbollah, the Al Aqsa Brigades and the Palestinian Islamist Jihad in the 
Occupied Territories and its close neighbours. .417 Numerous leaders of terrorist groups and 
                                               
411
 (Strindberg & Wärn, 2005, p. 26) 
412
 (Bergessi, 2008); (Huntington, 1996) 
413
 (Beck C. J., 2009, p. 339) 
414
 (Strindberg & Wärn, 2005, p. 31) 
415
 (Beck U. , 2010, p. 43) 
416
 (Beck C. J., 2009, p. 339) 
417
 (Wilner, 2010, p. 308) 
“THE TERRORIST IN A POSTMODERN PERCEPTION”  MICHAEL JOSEF RAAB, BAKK. PHIL 
PAGE | 89  
organisation have been killed through targeted attacks. But not only high ranked key figures 
have been assassinated. Among those targeted have been operators, facilitators, bomb 
makers, recruiters, commanders, and other mid-level organisers as well.418 Besides the 
tactical or strategic significance in counterterrorism campaigns, targeted killings could well be 
questioned for their legality or morality.  
There is hardly no doubt that targeted killings diminishes an organisations motivation to carry 
on coordinating campaigns of violence.419 However, is it morally just to pick out a specific 
individual and end his life, even if he is a terrorist? Is targeted killing simply a political correct 
term for assassination? In fact, there is somewhat of a distinction between targeted killings 
and assassination. The former mean the intentional slaying of an individual terrorist subject 
undertaken with explicit governmental approval.  
“They involve the use of lethal force, are designed to target specifically 
identified individuals, are carried out with the deliberate aim to kill the 
individual in question, are used against individuals not in the physical custody 
of the targeting actor, and are carried out by states.” 420  
The latter has a pejorative connotation of murder and treachery and is often associated with 
politically motivated murders of state representatives421, which falls under the 1974 UN 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against International Protracted 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. This Convention bans attacks on states 
representatives and officials, arguing that this would create a serious threat to the 
maintenance of normal international relations. The idea is that even states at war retain the 
diplomatic abilities to negotiate.422  
Still, the distinction is more than cloudy, and the fundamental question more or less remains 
the same. The legality of targeted killings remains unclear, as they involve the imposition of 
extrajudicial punishment on non-citizens, although the use of lethal force against an attacking 
enemy is an internationally recognised legal right, and if one is lawfully engaged in armed 
hostility, it is not assassination to target individuals who are combatants.423  
Nevertheless, there are as well normative issues, which have to be taken into consideration. 
For democracies in particular, the question whether the employment of coercive punishment 
against individuals or not is not at all an academic one.  
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“Those who authorize the hit are prosecutor, judge, and jury - and there is no 
appeal.” 424 
Therefore, targeted killings seem to rest outside the terrain of acceptable behaviour of 
democracies that enshrine civil liberties, due process- and constitutional limitation.425 
Especially in Western cultures, the sanctuary of human life is an essential pillar. The fight 
against terrorism seems in this sense to overturn the democratic nature of the targeting 
regime. However, as Freedman emphasises:  
“The advantage of stressing the importance of the liberal dimension is that it 
sets standards for Western governments, against which they should be judged 
when putting civilians at risk or in their treatment of prisoners. It reinforces the 
argument that the values at stake must be reflected in the conduct of wars and 
the struggle against terrorist groups.” 426 
Although it is undeniable, that the democratic response to terrorism avoid the excesses of 
repression and violation of human rights that will trigger more terrorism427, evidence show 
that despite the moral doubts, counter-terrorism tactics like targeted killings are reality.  
This suggests that the sanctuary of human life does not completely include terrorist actors 
and could be seen as a strong evidence for the first hypothesis, according to which terrorists 
are dehumanised through actual deeds. This De-Humanisation is implicitly executed through 
the objectification of the concrete individual to an abstract enemy image, which poses a 
surpassing threat to the Western society. Through labelling terrorists as combatants, though 
irregular combatants, military forces and the respective governments switch to a military 
connotation of the terrorist and thereby justify the killing of the individual.  
This is especially problematic, as irregular combatants are not granted the status of regular 
fighters, when they are hold in custody or sued at regular courts, if they are sued at all, as 
the examples of Guantanamo Bay or the administrative detention practice in Israel tragically 
demonstrate.  
Moreover, the use of torture, coercive interrogations, and indefinite detention underscores 
the mentioned moral hazards, as they, one the one hand poisoned the Muslim World with a 
virulent form of Anti-Americanism, and on the other hand, undermined the moral legitimacy of 
the West to call for civil rights in Islamic countries.428  
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“Whether there were one, two, ten, or a hundred such incidents, the 
cumulative effect of the treatment given those in detention polarized world 
opinion and hurt the ability of the United States to fight terrorism.” 429 
Throughout the paper at hand, the author tried to deliver evidence for the first hypothesis, 
which questioned the construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor and the resulting 
processes of De-Humanisation and De-Individualisation. This construction is mainly indicated 
through disputing the terrorists‟ rationality, the dichotomy of the good West and the evil non-
West and the curtailing of his civil rights. The narrative of the irrational, illegitimate fighter is 
probably best encapsulated by the following statement:  
“… the new enemy is fanatical.” 430 
The often-used term fanatical strongly indicates the lack of rationality, the terrorists‟ 
essentially evil character and denies the ability of conscious reasoning and decision-making.  
Especially the remarks in the chapter “The Rationality of the Terrorist”, strongly suggest that 
approaches, which argue that Islamist terrorists are mentally ill, irrational actors should be 
ruled out in media-, political-, as well as in scientific contributions. Especially as this narrative 
De-Individualisation moreover results in a factual De-Humanisation, which is manifested in 
counterterrorism means like the before discussed targeted killings. In the last preceding 
paragraphs, the author tried to highlight the consequences, as well as the moral hazards, 
which are evident if the values at stake aren´t applied on the means, which are actually 
meant to defend them.  
In sum, there is strong evidence for the assumption that first, the construction of the terrorist 
as an illegitimate actor is still pervasive, although more and more recent scientific 
contributions strongly argue at least against the attributed irrationality of terrorism on the 
tactical, as well as on the strategic level. Second, the consequences of this construction, 
namely the De-Humanisation and De-Individualisation, at least at the factual level, are more 
than evident, as shown in the previous paragraphs of this chapter.  
As long as this perception stays in the minds of decision makers, a sustainable approach of 
countering terrorism will further have a hard furrow to plough.  
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(H2) CONTEXTS 
The second hypothesis argued that the previously described construction of the terrorist 
causes a blind spot on psychological, socio economic, ethnic, cultural, religious and regional 
contexts of terrorism. It appears to be evident that as long as the dominating construction of 
the terrorist remains to be the one of an uneducated, mentally disturbed non-individual, there 
is no need for examining the terrorists‟ context for root causes of terrorism. Although it has 
been questioned whether root causes can be simply used to forecast terrorism, they 
nevertheless play a significant, though not always stringent role in the emerge of terroristic 
violence.  
However, once the step is made to regard the terrorist as a social human being just as every 
other individual, far more differentiated analysis of the presuppositions of terrorism can be 
taken into account. A special role belongs to the social framework conditions and peer 
groups, as these are important contexts of the radicalisation process. Moreover, it appears 
crucial to consider the historically grown and socialised cultural action patterns and norms 
concerning the use of violence as a legitimate instrument of resistance, in order to 
understand the genealogy of terrorism.  
More surprisingly is the disputed role of religion, economic conditions or the educational level 
as root causes of terror. While religion seems to be just as appropriate as any other ideology 
to develop extreme spin-offs and is moreover widely misused to legitimise originally political 
goals, economic conditions and the educational level seem to have, if any, a positive 
correlation with the emerge of terrorism as well on the micro- as on the macro-level. This 
observation strongly suggests the introduced concept of the terrorist as a political activist, 
especially as political circumstances like, state repression, party structure and the 
development of state institutions seem to be significant indicators of terrorism.   
 
(H3) ALTERNATIVES 
The third hypothesis targets the thinking barrier, which is caused by the dominant 
construction of the illegitimate actor. Although strongly tied to the first and second 
hypothesis, it goes a step forward and opens a pathway to a new interpretation of the 
phenomenon of terrorism.  
As we heard before, popular ascriptions of terrorists often include the concepts uncivilised, 
religious fundamentalist, uneducated, fanatic and mentally disturbed. According to the 
numerous contributions introduced in the paper at hand, these characteristic could well be 
discarded.  
What remains are the ascriptions enemy image, threat and foreign. This is highly significant 
as these ascriptions highlight the modern structure of the discourse about the terrorist, which 
is characterised through the dichotomy of Good and Evil, discussed earlier in this paper. 
Even among those cited authors, who suggest the existence of an intrinsic rationality within 
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the terrorists‟ decision-, action- and radicalisation processes and thus invalidate the 
conception of De-Individualisation and De-Humanisation, a vast majority still perceives 
Islamist terrorism as a foreign threat to the Western society; a threat, which is localised 
outside the Western value system, as it uses means like suicide attacks against 
noncombatants, which are illegitimate according to Western values and codes of conducts. 
Thus, the terrorist still remains an illegitimate actor, but not because of the lack of rationality, 
but because of the lack of morality in the terrorists‟ actions.   
Disputing an actors‟ rationality actually seems to cover the underlying assumption of the 
amorality of his actions. Once the step is made to proof the rationality of terror attacks, the 
popular discourses‟ intention to deny the morality of terror becomes visible. Obviously, it is 
the Western idea of morality, against which the terrorists‟ morality is pitted. Postmodern 
argumentation strongly suggests that on the one hand, the claim of the one and only morality 
has become obsolete and that there coexist different morality systems, and on the other 
hand, that an implicit distinction between the values of these systems along a hierarchical 
order is highly inadmissible, if not discriminating. Thus, the modern notion that rational 
behaviour leads to moral behaviour, according to its‟ Western conception, should be 
discarded in favour of a pluralism of value systems, not only among different frameworks, but 
even within the system itself. 
Consequently, the exclusion of terrorism from the Western sphere is, in times of a driving 
globalisation force, highly questionable, in regional just as in narrative terms. The 
globalisation of the Western hegemonic claim, with all its force, its immanence, manifested in 
the interconnectedness of the international economy and global finance markets, as well as 
in the international omnipresence of Western security forces, not only enables, but 
vociferously arrogates to itself a universal validity of its truth, its rationality, its morality and its 
values. Thus, terrorism happens not in some far away, underdeveloped regions, but in the 
very heart of our globalised society, manifested in the 9/11 attacks. 
In a discursive perception, terrorism could be understood as the manifestation of the clash of 
universalism431 and the forceful re-entry of everything that modernity expelled from its‟ 
intrinsic narrative of the one truth, the one rationality, the one morality and the one aesthetic, 
which again situates terror at the very heart of the Western culture, though on a symbolic 
level.  
This leads us straight to the fourth hypothesis of this endeavour to draw a new image of the 
terrorist.   
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(H4) DECONSTRUCTION 
The fourth hypothesis aims to deconstruct the ascribed image of the terrorist through the 
implementation of postmodern concepts. As discussed earlier, postmodernism is more or 
less characterised by a pluralism of value systems, the equal value of diametrical opposing 
Modi Vivendi, the multi dimensionality of social processes, by the appreciation of difference 
and heterogeneity as positive feature of society, by the end of meta-narratives and the great 
stories, and the pluralisation of the modern key concepts, truth, rationality and aesthetic.  
Contrary to modernity, which excludes, even denies the structural Other from its narrative, 
although this Other is, as we heard, inextricably interconnected with its‟ good, beautiful, just 
and moral counterparts, postmodernity is constituted through the re-entry of exactly this 
expelled Other. Terrorism, in this reasoning, is the violent manifestation of this re-entry of the 
inconceivable, unimaginable Other, which was granted no space, no right to exist and no 
mouthpiece in modernity.  
Therefore, the Western society is structurally unable to conquer global terrorism, as it still 
operates in the mindset of modernity, which is reality, while terrorism operates in the 
postmodern symbolic sphere.  
This symbolic sphere is first represented by the virtual character of terroristic events, which 
get their meaning mainly through electronic medias‟ footage, second by the fact that the main 
targets of terror attacks are symbols of the Western identity, and third by the irrevocable and 
unanswerable stake that perpetrators of terrorism put into play: their own death. Modernity 
includes no instruments to respond to this definitiveness of suicide attacks, which thus are 
promoted to divine sacrifices for their cause.  
Postmodern argumentation further suggest that the reason for this forceful re-entry of the 
expelled, the diminished, lies in the hegemonic force of globalisation. While the globalisation 
of economy is accelerating, the universality of Western values is eroded, as it can´t keep 
pace with the former. Moreover, fighting the perceived enemy of the West with means, which 
violate its very core values further undermine their universal claim. 
Finally, terrorism in a postmodern view could be understood as: 
“A strategy of turning around and overturning power, not in the name of a 
moral or religious confrontation, nor some clash of civilizations, but as a result 
of the pure and simple unacceptability of that global power.” 432 
This notion refers to the fact that every hegemon contains its respective subaltern moment 
within itself; and the more powerful, the more influential, the more universal the hegemonic 
power gets, the more likely it gets that the subaltern will try to destroy the hegemonic force.  
Even if that would mean the obliteration of both.  
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CONCLUSIONS & PROSPECT 
The initial research question was “Which postmodern alternative(s) could be opposed to the 
construction of the terrorist as an illegitimate actor?” 
Unfortunately, this short, on the first glimpse quite simple and definite question opened a 
wide field of scientific approaches from numerous disciplines. To find a possible answer to 
this little question, we head to examine two fundamental phenomenon, which were 
postmodernism and terrorism. In doing so, the author broached several academic disciplines, 
starting with terrorism and security studies including terrorisms‟ history, going further to social 
sciences dealing with the individual, group and society level, afterwards touching oriental 
studies, linguistic sciences and finally even philosophy. The reader may condone the one or 
another academic excess, as they deliver evidence for the complexity of the discussed topic. 
Furthermore is the author well aware of the criticisable aspects of this endeavour.  
First is the coverage of such a broad field of scientific contributions and concepts always 
vulnerable of lacking key considerations, which could be crucial for the topic. Nevertheless is 
there a glimmer of hope on the authors‟ part that the argumentation is at least within itself 
more or less consistent and comprehensible, although the educated reader will definitive 
stumble over several superficialities in the theoretical remarks.  
Second, one of the key concepts, which gave the initial spark to this thesis, is the terrorists‟ 
conception as an illegitimate actor. The author is well aware of the widely lack of explicit 
proof of this conception through empirical or theoretical contributions. Nevertheless, during 
the preparation of the utilised literature, the author came to the impression, that this 
conception, strongly indicated through the concept rationality, is generally accepted and 
widely recited, whether implicitly or explicitly, and could therefore be seen as scientific 
common sense. A qualitative analysis of media footage or policy makers‟ statements would 
have doubtless been an essential contribution to underline the normative force of this 
conception. However, as the authors‟ resources were admittedly limited and the focus was to 
deconstruct this conception, rather than to proof it, the author suppliantly refers to the 
outstanding efforts, which already have taken place in this field.  
Third, the remarks on Islam and Jihad are indubitably very short-handed, as the author has 
hardly no scientific background in oriental studies. Hence, and as it appeared to be crucial for 
the topic to include this discourse, the delivered argumentations are strongly based on the 
cited authors. Nevertheless should the remarks be sufficient to underline the main 
argumentation of the paper at hand. 
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Finally the author considered in the first place to organise this paper along the different 
layers of observation, which are the tactical-, strategic- and the global structure level of 
terrorism and the individual-, group- and social level as well as the global structure level of 
the terrorist, but dismissed this idea in favour of the current more narrative structure, which is 
supposed to be more appropriate. The author explicitly apologises for the resulting switches 
between the different observation levels.    
After this short retrospective evaluation, we shall, for the last time, go back to the research 
question, as despite of several hints and reprimands throughout the paper, a final and 
structured answer is still pending.  
 
THE POSTMODERN ISLAMIST TERRORIST 
The original idea, formulated in the research question, was to contrapose the dominating 
perception of the mentally ill Islamist terrorist with an alternative postmodern construction. 
The first step towards this goal was to examine terrorism on its tactical and strategic level, 
especially towards its rationality. During this examination, it turned out that the rationality 
inherent in terrorism seems to be widely accepted, at least in the cited literature, which 
opened the door for the argumentation that the perpetrators of terrorism are rational actors 
as well. Again, this assumption proofed to be true according to recent scientific contributions 
in this field. In addition, a discussion of root causes of terrorism, as well as of the social, 
cultural, religious, political and economic embeddedness of perpetrators of terrorism 
delivered significant hints to understand the complex radicalisation process and the 
individuals‟ motivations to turn to violent action.  
A first summary of these findings was delivered in the chapter “A Snapshot of the Terrorist”. 
This résumé seems to be even under a postmodern perception very accurate, as it described 
several inconsistencies, breaches and recommences, which as well characterise the 
postmodern, decentralised subject that is steadily forced to re-invent itself due to the lack of 
narrative certainties. The orientation on extremist religious ideologies could be understood as 
the attempt to regain a consistent system of values and norms, at least within a 
distinguishable community and lifeworld, which consequently serves as a source for an 
integrated identity in a world, increasingly characterised by the ambivalences of Western 
hegemony and globalisation.  
Although the rationality of Islamist terrorists is widely accepted in the scientific community, 
factual De-Individualisations and De-Legitimisations are still part of the popular discourse on 
these actors. This strongly suggests that the denial of their rationality actually targets the 
morality of their actions and not their instrumental purpose, which is measured in relation to 
the Western idea of morality, thus excluding the death of civilians or self-sacrifices as 
legitimate action patterns.  
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This is the point, where postmodernism could contribute a significant step forward, as it 
radically questions the idea of the universalism of morality, values, and Western rationality. 
On the individual and group level, this would mean that perpetrators of terrorism are not only 
profoundly rational actors, but are moreover acting according to an intrinsic moral imperative. 
May this imperative be religious or secular, postmodernism strongly suggests, that this 
morality must be understood as of the same value as the Western concept of morality, which 
finally falsifies the construction of the illegitimate actor and further underscores the concept 
of the terrorist being a political activist.  
Moreover, the idea that perpetrators of terrorism symbolise a foreign threat to the West is 
insofar wrong, as they represent and fight for exactly those values, rationalities, norms and 
lifestyles, which the modernity expelled from the Western sphere. In promoting its universal 
values through the inexorable process of globalisation, in demarcating the line between 
Good and Evil, the Western hegemonic force in fact initially produced the expelled Other that 
it now demonises. 
Thus, on a global structure level, a postmodern perspective would suggest that terrorism is 
the violent consequence of modernity‟s compulsion to impose Western values, norms, 
rationality and morality over each and everybody, distributed through globalisation, 
regardless of cultural, historical or ethnic particularities, and the consequential denial of 
alternative Modi Vivendi.    
The Islamist Terrorist in this perception becomes the agent of the forceful re-entry of the 
suppressed and denied structural Other, fighting on the symbolic level as the ultimate 
reflection of a modernity, which reached the peak of its expansion and consequently inverts 
itself in the implosion of postmodernism.  
Perpetrators of terrorism are therefore rational individuals, acting according to 
a distinctive moral code and mirroring all those attributes, the Western 
hegemony first constructed and afterwards desperately tried to expel from its 
entity, which locates these actors in the very heart of the Western system.  
This conclusion is indeed upsetting, and its consequences are even worse. But as long as 
this conflict between Western hegemony and Islamist terrorists focuses on the one truth and 
on the supremacy of one over the other, instead of understanding, that the both are the two 
sides of the same coin, the death toll will constantly spiral upwards.  
Instead, a postmodern approach would suggest that the acceptance of the pluralism of 
values could lead to the willingness to recognise the otherness of the others and to mutual 
tolerance.433 
                                               
433
 (Beck U. , 2010, p. 174) 
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“We should try to get beyond the moral imperative of unconditional respect for 
human life, and conceive that one might respect, both in the other and in 
oneself, something other than, and more than life: a destiny, a cause, a form 
of pride or of sacrifice.” 434 
And once tolerance could be transformed into solidarity, the postmodern ceasefire might 
probably even lead to peace. 
 
 
                                               
434
 (Baudrillard, 2003, p. 68) 
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ABSTRACT (GERMAN) 
Spätestens seit 9/11 und den damit verbundenen Schrecken wurde islamisch motivierter 
Terrorismus zu einem globalen Sicherheitsthema, welches nicht nur umfangreiche mediale 
Präsenz erlangte, sondern auch eine breite akademische Bearbeitung erfuhr. Die konkreten 
nationalen und internationalen Maßnahmen, mit welchen dem internationalen Terror 
begegnet wird, sind jedoch im Hinblick auf ihre Effektivität und Adäquanz durchaus kritisch 
zu betrachten.  
Abgesehen von fragwürdigen Militäreinsätzen, Lockerungen im Datenschutz und 
umfangreichen Beschneidungen der Bürger- und Menschenrechte hat ein Element des 
Diskurses das besondere Interesse des Autors erlangt: Die Konstruktion des Terroristen als 
Nicht-legitimer Akteur. Mit dieser Konstruktion sind zahlreiche Konsequenzen verbunden, 
welche vielleicht auf den ersten Blick nicht sofort ersichtlich sind. Die weitreichendste 
darunter ist wohl die De-Individualisierung oder die De-Humanisierung des Terroristen. 
Durch diesen Prozess wird dem Terroristen seine Menschlichkeit abgesprochen, wodurch 
ein ultimatives Feindbild für den Krieg gegen den Terror geschaffen wurde. Diese 
Konstruktion bewirkt, dass gewisse Terrorbekämpfungs- und Präventionsmaßnahmen 
bevorzugt werden, während andere aus dem Kreis der Handlungsopportunitäten vollkommen 
ausgeschlossen sind. Vor allem kreiert diese Herangehensweise jedoch einen blinden Fleck 
in der Wahrnehmung des Terroristen, welcher sozio-ökonomische, ethnische, kulturelle und 
regionale Kontexte nahezu vollständig in Dunkelheit hüllt und damit ein Verständnis für die 
komplexe Lebenswelt dieses ambivalenten Akteurs verunmöglicht. 
Durch die Anwendung postmoderner Konzepte soll das mit Stereotypen behaftete Bild des 
Terroristen dekonstruiert und neu geformt werden, um diesen in Beziehung zu der heutigen 
globalisierten Gesellschaft zu setzen und zu zeigen, dass es durchaus Alternativen zu den 
aktuell vorherrschenden Assoziationen, Zuschreibungen und Handlungsmöglichkeiten gibt.  
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